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LEGAL THEORY AND THE OBLIGATION OF A 
JUDGE: THE HART/DWORKIN DISPUTE 
E. Philip Soper*t 
Theories of law may be conceptual, descriptive, or normative. A 
conceptual theory aims at the identification of those features that 
are most important in justifying a decision to classify any social 
structure as a legal system. Such theories, are, in short, attempts at real 
definition of the concept of law or of a legal system.1 Professor H.L.A. 
Hart's theory, published in book form in 1961, is a conceptual theory.2 
A descriptive theory aims at the more modest goal of identifying im-
portant features of one or more particular legal systems without 
concern for whether such features are to be found wherever the 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.A. 1964, Washington 
University; J.D. 1969, Harvard University; Ph.D. 1972, Washington University.-
Ed. 
t I am grateful to my colleagues, Don Regan, Terry Sandalow, and Rich Lem-
pert for their assistance in discussing earlier versions of this article. 
1. By "real definition" I mean to identify broadly those enterprises that make 
objective claims concerning the correlation of the preanalytic phenomenon men-
tioned in the definiendum with postanalytic, nonverbal phenomena mentioned in the 
definiens. I mean to contrast both "lexical definitions" (which correlate definien-
dum with actual or dictionary usage) and "stipulative definitions" ( which propose 
correlations, but make no objective claims). Much of the dispute over whether "real 
definition" is possible, particularly in the present context, see note 2 infra; cf. R. 
SARTORIUS, INDIVIDUAL CONDUCT AND SOCIAL NORMS, 35-37 (1975) [hereinafter cited 
as R. SARTORIUS, !NDIVIDU4L CONDUCT], arises on the assumption that the term refers 
exclusively to the classical enterprise of classifying per genus et diff erentiam, with 
the aim of producing necessary and sufficient conditions for the correct use of a 
term. That enterprise, however, is only one of at least twelve distinct activities that 
have gone by the name of "real definition." R. ROBINSON, DEFINITION ch. 6 (1954). 
My use of the term "conceptual theory" does not presuppose a particular defini-
tional theory beyond that stated above, although I am inclined to agree with those 
who suggest that "real definition" in the classical sense is not as promising an under-
taking (if it is possible at all) as the more modest goal of analyzing a complex con-
cept into important, distinguishing features that yield an increased insight into the 
nature of the concept. See id.; R. SARTORIUS, INDIVIDUAL CONDUCT, supra, at 37-50. 
For the meaning of "importance" in this context, see Sartorius, Book Review, 52 
ARCHIV FUR RECHTS-UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 161, 163 (1966). 
2. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961) [hereinafter cited as CONCEPT 
OF LAw]. Hart's insistence that he is not providing a definition of law, see id. 
at 16, should probably be understood as referring to definition in the classical sense. 
See note 1 supra. Even in that sense, commentators have detected equivocation in 
Hart's characterization of the enterprise in which he is engaged. See Brown, Book 
Review, 72 PHIL. REV. 250 (1963); Singer, Hart's Concept of Law, 60 J. PHIL. 197, 
200 (1963). Compare Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, 70 L.Q. REV. 
37 (1954) and CONCEPT OF LAw, supra, at 16, with CONCEPT OF LAW, supra, at 
113. 
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phenomenon of law is encountered. A descriptive theory thus may 
or may not conflict with a conceptual theory. Where conflict 
does result, it is by way of counterexample rather than countertheory. 
Confronted with features identified as important in a descriptive 
theory but ignored in his own, a conceptual theorist may respond to 
the apparent counterexample in three ways: (1) he may dispute the 
accuracy of the description; (2) he may assume that the features have 
been accurately described, but deny that they are incompatible with 
the basic conceptual model; or (3) he may deny that the structure 
being described is in fact a legal system. Professor Ronald Dworkin, 
in a recent trilogy of articles, 3 has advanced a descriptive theory4 of 
the Anglo-American legal system; he claims that the theory furnishes 
a counterexample to the related conceptual theories of legal positivism 
in general and of Professor Hart in particular. He also claims that 
the theory provides a normative account of law5 preferable to the 
account provided by positivism. 
The conceptual core of the positivist's theory, which Dworkin 
attacks, is the claim that legal validity is determined by reference to a 
master test-a standard or set of standards external to the judge that 
can in theory be identified empirically and that serves as the ultimate 
justification of the claim that the judge's decision in any particular 
3. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. Cm. L. REV. 14 (1967), reprinted in 
LAW, REASON & JusncE 3 (G. Hughes ed. 1969), and as ls Law a System of Rules?, 
in EssAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (R. Summers ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as Model 
of Rules]; Dworkin, Social Rules and Legal Theory, 81 YALE L.J. 855 (1972) [here-
inaHer cited as Social Rules]; Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV, 1057 (1975) 
[hereinafter cited as Hard Cases]. See also Dworkin, Judicial Discretion, 60 J. 
PHIL. 624 (1963). 
4. I take Dworkin's theory to be descriptive rather than conceptual in part be-
cause that is how he characterizes it, see Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1101, and 
in part because it has been implicitly presented from the beginning as a counter-
example to positivism, rather than as an attempt to explicate the general concept 
of "law" or "legal system." The possibility that one can view the theory as concep-
tual, in which case the argument for the theory remains incomplete, is briefly consid-
ered at the conclusion of this paper. See text at note 145 infra. 
5. A normative theory describes the essential features that a legal system ought 
to display. The proponent of such a theory is not an essential antagonist of either 
the conceptual or the descriptive theorist. The normative theorist may critically eval-
uate a descriptive account of law by indicating the extent to which features identified 
as prominent aspects of a particular legal system accord with the features that the 
system ought to display. But the normative theorist cannot assume a similarly criti-
cal stance toward the conceptual theorist without turning the quest for real defini-
tion into a dispute about the most appropriate stipulative definition of law. The 
normative theorist who finds himself at odds with the conceptual theorist must 
either claim that only stipulative definitions are possible in this context, or he must 
meet the latter on his own grounds by explaining why the conceptual theory, to 
the extent it is incompatible with the normative account, also proves to be an inaccu-
rate analysis of "law." Because I am concerned only with the latter dispute in 
this paper, the normative aspect of Dworkin's theory will be largely ignored. But 
cf. note 99 infra. 
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case is in accordance with "the law."6 The features of the Anglo-
American legal system that Dworkin claims cannot be accommodated 
to such a "master-test model" are described by the following three 
propositions, all of which Dworkin asserts and all of which I take to be 
different ways of expi:essing a similar idea: 
(1) There is a uniquely correct legal result in every judicial case; 
(2) In deciding cases, judges never have discretion to select one of 
two or more equally permissible results; 
(3) The legal system, at any given moment, is a system of fully 
determined entitlements. (That is to say, individuals never 
approach courts as lobbyists might a legislature, arguing for de-
cisions claimed to further collective goals or political aims of 
of the society. Rather, litigants approach courts armed with 
arguments of principle, correctly claiming that pre-existing in-
dividual or group rights determine the result a court must reach 
whether or not some collective goal of society or general politi-
cal aim is thereby served or for that matter disserved.) 
This third formulation Dworkin calls the "rig~ts thesis."7 On its 
plausibility hinge solutions not only to questions about how judges 
should approach and decide cases but also, Dworkin claims, to the 
persistent puzzle about whether legal norms can even in theory be 
separated from the broader class of norms encompassing political and 
moral views of society. 
6. I label the master-test theory the "conceptual core" of legal positivism pri-
marily for purposes of describing Dworkin's argument. See Model of Rules, supra 
note 3, at 17. (For a sampling of the variety of ways in which "positivism" is 
used, see CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 2, at 253-54. See also text at note 132, 
infra.) On this view of the "conceptual core of positivism," the difference between 
Hart and his predecessors, Austin and Kelsen, lies primarily in refinements that are 
made in describing the nature of the master test. In the view of both Kelsen and 
Hart, Austin's description of law as the "command of the sovereign" ignores the 
normative character of the phenomenon. The laws of a legal system are always 
viewed by at least some members of the system-the officials-as imposing obliga-
tions, whereas "command" and "habit," however ingeniously combined, can never 
produce more than the concept of "being obliged." See CONCEPT OF LAw, supra 
note 2, at 79-83, 243. For Kelsen, the solution is simply to build the concept of 
obligation into legal theory from the start as a primitive presupposition of any legal 
system. Austin's sovereign, the "determinate person or body," is replaced by a 
"norm"-the Grundnorm-the origin and nature of which are not further explained, 
but simply "hypothesized." Hart's theory resembles Kelsen's, although the "rule of 
recognition" replaces Kelsen's Grundnorm and, instead of leaving the origin of this 
basic rule unexplained or "hypothesized," Hart simply roots it in the empirical fact 
of acceptance by the officials of a system. The rule of recognition is the ultimate 
criterion for legal validity and is itself empirically established by inspecting the atti-
tudes and behavior of the officials of the system. See id. at 97-114, 245. See 
generally J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (H.L.A. Hart 
ed. 1954); H. KELSEN, GENERAL 'fHEoRY OF LAW AND STATE (1949). 
7. See Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1058-60. Although the rights thesis entails 
two claims--that there is a single correct answer in judicial cases and that the answer 
is to be extracted from "principles" rather than "policies"-! shall be concerned pri-
marily with the former claim. 
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The rights thesis will no doubt strike many as naive or implausi-
ble. Not since Blackstone has the view that judges only "find" and 
do not "make" the law been preached with any fervor from academic 
pulpits, whatever the "plain man's" view of the matter might be. 
Indeed, under the influence of legal realism, many have suggested 
that the more difficult task is to demonstrate that judges ever find 
results required by pre-existing standards rather than continuously 
create new law through the unavoidable exercise of a kind of quasi-
legislative discretion. Hart himself has adopted a familiar and widely 
accepted stance between these extremes. 8 Legal standards can and 
often do determine results. It is, however, a feature of man's predica-
ment that his · relative "ignorance of fact" and "indeterminancy of 
aim" yield areas of "open texture" in the application of such stand-
ards that require judges to make "a fresh choice between open 
alternatives. "0 The pervasiveness of this moderate view may explain 
why much of the discussion generated to date by Dworkin's account 
has taken the form of the first of the three above-mentioned responses 
to a descriptive theory: a challenge to the accuracy of the account.10 
This article offers a review of the Hart-Dworkin dispute11 and a 
qualified defense of the positivist's model against Dworkin's attack. 
The defense is cast primarily in the form of the second possible 
response to a descriptive theory: Dworkin's attack fails, I suggest, 
because it involves descriptive claims that can be accommodated to 
the positivist's conceptual theory regardless of one's view about the 
plausibility of those claims. 
In reviewing the dispute, this paper also explores a secondary 
thesis that appears to have become an erroneous and unnecessary part 
of Dworkin's main argument. The secondary thesis concerns the 
8. See CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 2, at ch. VII. 
9. Id. at 125. 
10. See, e.g., Christie, The Model of Principles, 1968 DUKE L.J. 649; Greenawalt, 
Discretion and Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for the Fetters That Bind 
Judges, 75 CoLUM. L. REV. 359 (1975); Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of 
Law, 81 YALE L.J. 823, 845-46 (1972); Tapper, A Note 011 Principles, 34 Moo. L. 
REV. 628 (1971). Professor Sartorius is one of the few contemporary partici-
pants in the dispute, besides Dworkin, who accepts and forcefully argues for a version 
of the rights thesis. See note 13 infra. See also I. SMrrn, LEGAL OBLIGATION ch. 
IX (1976); Coval & Smith, Some Structural Properties of Legal Decisio11, 32 CAM· 
BRIDGE L.J. 81 (1973). 
11. "Dispute," I confess, implies a less one-sided exchange than in fact has taken 
place. Except for a brief comment, see Hart, Law in the Perspective of Philoso-
phy: 1776-1976, 51 N.Y.U.L. REV. 538, 545-51 (1976), Hart has not responded 
specifically to Dworkin's arguments, although he has reconfirmed views concerning 
judicial discretion that indicate continued disagreement with claims made by the 
rights thesis. See id.; Hart, Problems of the Philosophy of Law in 6 ENCYC. OF 
PHILOSOPHY 264, 271 (1967). 
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proper classification of the standards to which judges are and ought 
to be responsive in reaching legal decisions. Although Hart's posi-
tion here is not entirely clear, Dworkin claims that such standards are 
fundamentally of two kinds: either authoritatively binding on a 
judge and hence "law," or "permissive" and hence extra-legal. I shall 
argue that this is too summary a way of dealing with the variety of 
standards that determine the specific content of the obligation of a 
judge qua judge. Some standards bind judges, not because they are 
law, but simply because they are part of what it means to be a judge. 
The nature of my defense of positivism explains the organization 
of this essay. Although Dworkin's most recent article, Hard Cases, 12 
contains the fullest elaboration of the rights thesis, that piece is 
exclusively concerned with the theory's descriptive and normative 
claims. It does not renew the argument designed to show why the 
thesis constitutes a counterexample to positivism. For that discus-
sion, one must turn to Dworkin's earlier writings. Part I, then, exam-
ines the initial version of the argument and isolates the critical claim 
in the counterexample thesis. Part II explores the "secondary the-
sis"-the possibility, and the relevance for legal theory, of separating 
investigations into certain aspects of judicial obligation from investi-
gations into legal validity. With these clarifications in hand, Part III 
returns to an evaluation of Dworkin's major argument. Although the 
section begins with a review of the difficulties Dworkin faces in 
establishing the rights thesis, the primary concern in Part III is not 
with the plausibility of that thesis. Dworkin may have failed to prove 
his claims, but he has at least succeeded, I believe, in showing that the 
evidence for the contrary position is equally inconclusive. In this 
respect Dworkin's contribution is significant, both as a counterweight 
to the tendency to accept uncritically realist dogma in any version, 
however moderate, and as a plausible explanation of what it might 
mean to accept a Blackstonian view of the law without also accepting 
some of the more cryptic natural law underpinnings of Blackstone's 
writings. Even assuming, however, that the rights thesis is ,correct, 
Part III suggests that it need not be seen as incompatible with a 
positivist model of law.13 Part IV offers some concluding observa-
tions on the significance of the dispute and suggests a line of inquiry 
12. See note 3 supra. 
13. The position adopted here is thus similar to that of Professor Sartorius, who 
defends a version of the rights thesis but also argues-on somewhat different grounds 
from those relied on here-that it is compatible with positivism. See R. SARTORIUS, 
INDIVIDUAL CoNDUCT, supra note 1, at ch. 10; Sartorius, Social Policy and Judicial 
Legislation, 8 AM. PHIL. Q. 151 (1971). 
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that is more likely to pose a challenge to the positivist's model than is 
Dworkin's descriptive theory. 
I. DWORKIN: TuE ORIGINAL POSITION 
The chief weapon in Dworkin's initial attack on positivism was 
a claimed logical distinction between two kinds of legal stan-
dards: rules and principles. Rules, like dictators, always get their 
way. A rule, that is to say, is either app1icable to a particular 
situation, in which case its directions must be accepted, or it is 
inapplicable, in which case it contributes nothing to the decision. 14 
When two rules conflict, one does not supersede the other because of 
its greater weight, but only because, for example, another rule speci-
fies which shall take precedence. A principle, in contrast, like a wise 
counselor, "states a reason that argues in one direction,"16 but does 
not by itself command a particular decision. When principles con-
flict, the conflict must be resolved by assessing the relative weights of 
the competing principles. 16 
Armed with these distinctions, Dworkin's counterexample argu-
ment proceeds through the following steps: 
( 1) There are cases in the Anglo-American legal system 
(Dworkin calls them "hard cases") where no applicable rule 
determines the result the judge should reach. Examples include 
cases that involve the creation of a new cause of action, such as 
one for invasion of privacy, or the creation of a new exception 
to an existing rule, as in Riggs v. Palmer,11 where the court decided 
that a murderer could not inherit under his victim's will despite 
an inheritance statute that did not literally provide for such an 
exception. 
(2) In such cases it is a mistake to say that the judge has 
discretion to decide what result to reach. It is still appropriate 
to speak of a correct decision to which the parties are entitled and 
which the judge is obligated to reach by reference to principles. In 
Riggs, for example, the court justified its decision by referring to the 
principle that "no man should profit from his own wrong."18 
(3) The principles in these cases are obligatory and binding 
14. To use Dworkin's illustrations, a will is either valid or not, depending on 
whether it complies with the rule for making wills (which may include stated excep• 
tions), and a baseball player is either out because the rule that three strikes consti-
tutes an out is applicable, or he is not. See Model of Rules, supra note 3, at 25. 
15. Id. at 26. 
16. See id. at 25-29. 
17. 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1'889). 
18. 115 N.Y. at 509, 22 N.E. at 190. 
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on the officials in the same way that a rule is and hence are "law" 
in the same sense that rules are. That is, they are "standards 
binding upon the officials of a community, controlling their deci-
sions of legal right and obligation."19 
( 4) It is not possible to modify the positivist's master test 
(Hart's rule of recognition) to embrace principles because (a) 
there is no general scheme for generating such principles-like 
the rule of recognition they are simply accepted-and (b) we 
cannot list said principles exhaustively ( thus simply adding them 
to the rule of recognition) because "[t]hey are controversial, their 
weight is all important, they are numberless, and they shift and 
change so fast that the start of our list would be obsolete before 
we reached the middle."20 
(5) Thus, the positivists' claim that a law of the community 
can be distinguished from other social standards of the com-
munity by some test in the form of a master rule must be aban-
doned. 
This section examines, first, the underlying distinction between 
rules and J?rinciples on which the entire argument is based and, 
second, the critical initial premise in the argument-namely, that 
cases like Riggs are properly described as cases in which no rule 
compels the judge's decision. 21 
A. Rules and Principles 
l. Agreeing on Terminology 
Few subjects are as notoriously vulnerable as legal philosophy to 
disputes that, upon examination, prove to be merely verbal. Appar-
ently incompatible answers to what seems a single question-"what is 
law?"-often turn out to be answers to quite different and unrelated 
questions, reflecting differences in the underlying purpose of the 
inquiry that must be understood if one is to measure the inquiry's 
success.22 A comparison of Dworkin's use of "rule" with Hart's 
analysis of the same term illustrates how difference in purpose can 
lead to difference in terminology. 
Hart's description of law as a system of rules is the result of an 
analysis intended primarily to distinguish rules from both habits and 
19. Model of Rules, supra note 3, at 27. 
20. Id. at 45. 
21. Part II of this article explores the third step in the argument. Parts IIl(A) 
and Ill(B) examine, respectively, the second and fourth steps. 
22. See S.I. BENN & R.S. PETERS, THE PRINCIPLES OF PoLmCAL THOUGHr 65-
67 (1959). 
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coercive orders. 23 Although a similar pattern of behavior may be 
observed in all three cases, an observer could record an additional 
phenomenon only in the case of rules: deviation from the pattern 
would become the occasion for criticism, which the group regards as 
legitimate. This additional characteristic evidences a "reflective 
critical attitude" toward the rule that is not present in the case of hab-
its or coercive orders. As others have noted, 24 nothing in this ac-
count requires limiting "rules" in Hart's sense to entities that operate 
in all-or-nothing fashion. Given group acceptance of a set of goals 
that are to be achieved or maintained, behavior that disregards or 
accords inappropriate weight to principles reflecting such goals will 
evoke reactions evidencing the same "internal aspect" that dis-
tinguishes such standards from habits and from orders backed by 
threats. 
Not all disputes, of course, dissolve at a touch of terminological 
clarification. This dispute in particular does not. Whatever the 
label, one can purport to distinguish between legal propositions that 
do, and those that do not, function in all-or-nothing fashion, giving 
the latter the special name of "principles." The clarification does 
serve as a warning, however, that one does not attack Hart's position 
simply by showing that law includes something other than all-or-
nothing "rules."25 The essence of Dworkin's argument is, and must 
be, not that some principles are law, but that no master test can 
capture all the principles that are law. 
2. Isolating the Relevant Distinction 
With an eye out for verbal disputes, it is easier to focus di-
rectly on the alleged functional or logical distinction between rules 
23. See CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 2, at 54-60, 79-88. 
24. See, e.g., Raz, supra note 10, at 845. ' 
25. At times, Dworkin's argument appears to be of just this sort. For example, 
in addition to his argument from the nature of a "hard case," Dworkin employs 
an argument based on the problem of precedent and the fact that courts often must 
and do overrule prior decisions. See Model of Rules, supra note 3, at 22-29. In 
attempting to account for this phenomenon, the positivist, according to Dworkin, 
faces a dilemma similar to that which he faces in attempting to account for judicial 
decision in the hard case. The positivist might admit that no judge-made rule is 
ever binding on the court, thus abolishing precedent altogether and conceding the 
field to the realist. Or, the positivist must say that judges can properly overrule 
precedents only in certain cases (e.g., when the prior decision was wrong, when it 
has not caused a great deal of reliance, or when it has evoked considerable criticism). 
But to limit the power to overrule to these standards is to admit that principles 
as well as rules are binding on courts, for that is what such standards amount to. 
At most this argument establishes only that there are some legal principles, a 
conclusion that need not trouble Hart. Because his use of "rule" does not confine 
him to Dworkin's all-or-nothing meaning, Hart could admit that the tests for over-
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and principles.26 For purpose of clarity, let us talk of the latter as 
operating in "flexible," as opposed to "automatic," fashion. Given a 
particular legal standard, what is the key to determining which way 
the standard operates? 
One possibility is that the key is to be discovered by inspecting the 
standard itself. Where the standard is vague, prohibiting, for exam-
ple, "unreasonable uses of the park" or "unreasonable restraints of 
trade," it might be thought that the standard operates flexibly; one 
determines what is "unreasonable" by considering the full range of 
goals served or disserved by a particular activity, and by assigning 
weights to resolve conflicts. Dworkin, however, insists that words like 
"reasonable" and "unjust" make rules "more like principles," but do 
not turn them into principles. This is so because "even the least 
confining of those terms restricts the kind of other principles and 
policies on which the rule depends."27 It is conceivable, for example, 
that "unreasonable" restraints of trade should still be permissible be-
cause of other policies-a result that is forbidden if the standard is a 
rule, but not if it is a principle. 28 
This position is puzzling in part because of Dworkin's suggestion 
that words like "unreasonable" must always be interpreted to restrict 
the potential policies that bear on the determination of "unreasonable-
ness." It may be that the actual standards that Dworkin has in mind 
do, in fact, reflect a prior determination that the vague antecedent 
conditions of the rule refer only to a limited range of policies. But 
that is a matter to be determined not by a priori inspection of the 
standard, but only by taking account of other evidence concerning 
how the standard is to be treated. There may, for example, be a 
general provision in the legal system prohibiting broad delegation or 
judicial exercise of legislative power. But more important than one's 
explanation of this particular puzzle is what this discussion reveals 
about the real distinction between rules and principles: One deter-
mines whether a standard is a rule or a principle by paying attention 
to explicit or implicit directions accompanying the standard (to which 
the language may be a guide) that indicate how the standard is to 
function. A standard is a rule, however vague, if it embraces a 
ruling are "principles," and still preserve his master-test theory simply by adding 
them (having limited them in number to a finite class) to the rule of recognition. 
26. Henceforth, I shall use "standards" to include broadly all norms of whatever 
kind, with "legal standards" embracing (in Dworkin's sense) both legal "rules" and 
legal "principles." In this respect, I follow Raz's terminology. See Raz, supra note 
10, at 824 n.4. 
27. -See Model of Rules, supra note 3, at 29 (emphasis original). 
28. See id. at 28-29; Social Rules, supra note 3, at 889-90. 
482 Michigan Law Review I.Vol. 75:473 
limited range of principles and policies that are taken to be exclusively 
relevant. The rule then operates "automatically" by definition: 
Conduct measured by the set of principles made relevant by the 
rule cannot escape the resulting evaluation by appeal to non-relevant, 
excluded principles. Conversely, a standard whose antecedent con-
ditions are quite specific ("any activity that results in a noise level 
exceeding fifty decibels") will nonetheless be a principle if accom-
panying directions make clear that the standard merely constitutes 
one consideration (set in this case at a specific threshold level) that 
inclines toward prohibition but that must be balanced against other 
considerations before legal consequences are attached to challenged 
conduct. 
Rules, in short, exhibit the following features: (1) They do not 
lose their status as rules simply because one must refer to the underly-
ing policies or purposes in order to decide how the rule is to be 
applied in a particular case (e.g., what is an "unreasonable" restraint 
of trade); and (2) rules differ from principles only because they are 
interpreted to make legally irrelevant any other principles or purposes 
except those underlying the rule. If this analysis is correct, the 
"rule-principle" distinction seems useful at best only after the fact, as 
a label for the conclusion that certain standards alone are relevant in 
deciding a case. 29 
This discussion may explain why commentators have found 
Dworkin's treatment of a case like Riggs misleading. 30 Dworkin 
describes the case as if the court's decision-that a murderer will not 
be permitted to inherit under his victim's will-cannot be explained 
by reference to the "rule" governing inheritance, but only by refer-
ence to a principle ("no man should profit from his own wrong"). 
But if the decision is correct, one can account for it in either of two 
ways. The first possibility is that the rule governing inheritance did 
not, in fact, preclude reference to the "no-profit" principle as one of 
the policies underlying the rule. According to this view, the court in 
Riggs did no more than a court does in deciding what is "unreasona-
ble" under a rule employing that term. The only difference is that in 
Riggs the explicit language of the inheritance standard would not seem 
to leave as much room for an underlying "no-profit" principle as 
would a rule employing the term "unreasonable." Thus the court 
29. See Tapper, supra note 10, at 630. Among arguments by others who have 
also questioned the utility of the rule-principle distinction, Professor Tapper's concise 
analysis in particular merits careful scrutiny. 
30. See, e.g., Christie, supra note 10, at 660-67; Note, Understanding the Model 
of Rules, 81 YALE L.J. 912, 921-34 (1972). 
January 1977] Hart/Dworkin Dispute 483 
must rely, as it did in Riggs, on implicit indicia of intent to discover 
this particular policy-embracing qualification of the literal language. 
Alternatively, one may explain the result by construing the inheri-
tance standard as a principle to be balanced against 'others, including 
the "no-profit" principle, to decide who inherits under wills. The 
fact that, in most cases, results coincide with what the inheritance 
standard seems to require would only be evidence of the standard's 
great weight, sufficient to overcome the weight of purportedly coun-
tervailing considerations in all but the rarest cases, with Riggs being 
one of the rarities. 31 
This potential for rationalizing any set of results under a legal 
standard by characterizing the standard either as a principle or a rule 
reenforces doubts about the functional utility of the distinction. If 
the only controlling question is whether standard "A" (thei "no-
profit" maxim) is legally relevant in determining the applicability of 
standard "B," ( the inheritance statute), and if that question is settled 
by reference to implicit authorization concerning how "B" is to be 
treated, then one might as well dispense with the distinction and move 
directly to the question of authorization. 82 
3. The Relevance of the Distinction 
Whatever the real distinction between rules and principles, one 
may wonder what difference the difference makes. Why make the 
distinction in the first place? Dworkin's reason for making the 
distinction is to show that the positivist's master test for law is 
inadequate. 33 This suggests that the value of the distinction can be 
ascertained by asking whether the claimed inability of the positivist' s 
model to accommodate all legal principles is in some way a conse-
quence of the "flexibility" of principles. 
It often appears that this is what Dworkin means to say-in-
deed, that this is the very reason for his focusing so closely on the 
feature of flexibility as opposed to automatic operation. In fact, 
however, Dworkin's argument does not depend on the distinction. 
Principles cannot be captured in a master test, we are told, because 
(1) they exhibit no unifying feature that would allow their generation 
31. Neither explanation, it should be noted, is Dworkin's. The crucial question 
of how principles can coexist and interact with rules in a case like Riggs, if one 
accepts, Dworkin's definition of these two kinds of standards, has never been ade-
quately explained. See Tapper, supra note 10, at 630. 
32. Dworkin continues to defend the rule-principle distinction, but claims that 
the distinction could be abandoned without giving up the attack on positivism. See 
Social Rules, supra note 3, at 882-90. 
33. See Model of Rules, supra note 3, at 22. 
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from a single formula and (2) they are too controversial, numerous, 
and changing for an exhaustive listing. Neither characteristic is a 
consequence of flexibility. Theoretically, a group might accept nu-
merous, continually changing rules that exhibit no unifying feature. 
In that case, too, no advance test could capture all the group's laws. 34 
The critical premise in Dworkin's argument is simply ,the claim that 
there are a large number of unrelated legal standards that are inde-
pendently accepted as law and that can be discovered only by inspect-
ing the current practices of lawyers, judges, and the public: "The 
origin of these as legal principles lies not in a particular decision of 
some legislature or court, but in a sense of appropriateness developed 
in the profession and the public over time. "35 It is this fact of 
spontaneous, independent growth that makes it possible to deny the 
existence of an advance test for law; whether the standard itself is .a 
rule or a principle is not essential to the argument. 
B. On Running Out of Rules: Hard Cases, Easy Cases and Really 
Hard Cases. 
The critical claim in Dworkin's argument, then, is that some legal 
standards, like Topsy, just grow. The rule-principle distinction is of 
little use in either explaining this phenomenon or in drawing the line 
between those standards that can and those that cannot be captured 
by the positivist's master test. One way to focus on the assumptions 
on which the critical claim is based is to examine more carefully the 
notion of a "hard case"-the decisional context that gives rise in the 
first place to the alleged counterexample to the positivist's theory. 
What exactly is a "hard case," and what requires the positivist in such 
cases to admit that his model provides no legal standards to control 
the judge's decision?36 
One possibility is that the term "hard cases" refers to real gaps or 
34. The possibility that rules as well as principles can undermine the positivist's 
theory is illustrated by Dworkin's account of custom and customary rules. Like his 
principles, these rules too have simply developed into acceptance without the need 
for prior legislative or judicial enactment. They are binding, and hence "law," not 
because they are valid under some master test, but because-like the master test 
itself-they are simply accepted as binding. -See Model of Rules, supra note 3, at 
44.- Because there are not as many of these customary rules, Dworkin concedes 
that this is only a "chip" in the master-test theory. Id. •But the "chip" here is, 
in theory, the same kind of "hole" that Dworkin claims he has found in the case 
of principles. 
35. Id. at 41. 
36. For one of the few explorations of the notion of a "hard case" in this con-
text, see Perry, Judicial Method and the Concept of Reasoning, 80 ETlilcs 1, 3-
6 & n.4 (1969). See also Gross, Jurisprudence, 1968/69 ANN. SURVEY OF AM. L. 
575, 576-77; Note, supra note 30, at 921-34. 
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lacunae in a legal system, in the sense that legal standards fail to say 
anything at all about whether challenged conduct is permitted or 
prohibited. 37 The suggestion, however, that municipal legal systems 
in general, and the American legal system in particular, include "open 
spaces" of this sort is not at all an obvious one. Whatever the 
situation in international faw, municipal legal systems are generally 
thought to have "closed" themselves by including "some kind of 
residual principle the effect of which is to occupy the space which 
would otherwise be devoid of law."38 The most common such 
principle, dubbed the "residual negative principle" by Professor Ju-
lius Stone, provides "that everything which is not legally prohibited is 
deemed to be legally permitted."39 This principle, of course, can 
easily be included in the positivist's rule of recognition. If one views 
the legal system as including such a standard, it might then seem 
wrong to describe Riggs and the privacy case as examples, on the 
positivist's model, of situations where there is no applicable law. If 
there really is no standard prohibiting invasions of privacy, then the 
law would necessarily be that such activity is legally permitted. As 
for Riggs, either the law is that testators' wishes are always 
respected-even in the case of the beneficiary who has murdered the 
testator-or the law itself provides an exception for the homicidal 
legatee. For reasons similar to those that cast doubt on the functional 
utility of the rule-principle distinction, Riggs is not a case for which 
there is "no law," but simply one in which it is difficult to discover 
just what the law is. 
Although a variation of this argument appears in the literature, 40 
it fails as an attack on Dworkin's position. Dworkin need not, and, as 
far as I can tell, does not claim that the positivist must run into real 
gaps in the sense described above. Even assuming that the American 
legal system is closed, the positivist's test, according to Dworkin, 
would not be capable of determining in some cases whether chal-
lenged conduct is in fact legally prohibited. This determination is a 
prerequisite to following the further closure instructions contained in 
the residual negative principle. 41 Dworkin's concern is not with the 
logical ability to formulate a rule post hoc for every case, but with the 
more troublesome problem of explaining how one moves from pre-
37. It is in this sense that scholars debate whether a non-liquet can exist under 
international law. See Stone, "Non Liquet" and the Function of Law in the Interna-
tional Community, 35 BRIT. Y.B. OF INTL. L. 124 (1959). 
38. See J. STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWYERS REASONING 189 (1964). 
39. Id. 
40. See Note, supra note 30, at 924-27. 
41. Cf. Stone, supra note 37, at 134. 
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existing standards ("no vehicles in the park") to the new formulation 
in the case to be decided ("no go-karts in the park"). In Dworkin's 
view the move is always by way of pre-existing legal standards. If 
the positivist believes that the only standards he is able to identify 
(the "no-vehicle" statute) will not determine the result, he should 
cast his net on another side to yield a catch that will. 
This account suggests a second possible meaning for "hard 
case": Rz'ggs is a hard case just because a judge must tum to 
something beyond the bare language of existing, formulated rules 
( the inheritance statute) in ·order to discover the result required in the 
case. But this definition raises doubts about whether anything re-
mains to fill the role of an "easy case."42 No rule is self-applying in 
the sense that it relieves a judge of the need to classify the facts and to 
determine whether, thus classified, they fall within the scope of the 
rule. The only possible candidate for an "easy case" would appear to 
be one in which the correct decision could be determined solely by 
reference to the language of the rule and the meaning of its terms, 
making reference to other standards (purposes, policies, principles) 
unnecessary. Although Hart in the celebrated exchange with Profes-
sor Fuller suggests that such cases do exist, 43 he does not suggest that 
they are the only cases that yield correct decisions and that all the rest 
represent judicial exercises in legislative discretion. The "meanings 
of words," writes Hart, "may be controlled by reference to the pur-
pose of a statutory enactment which itself may be explicitly stated or 
generally agreed." "[I]t is tempting [but an oversimplification] to 
ascribe [agreement in clear cases] simply to the fact that there are 
necessarily such agreements in the use of the shared conventions of 
language. "44 
42. That the notion of an "easy case" can prove as difficult to pin down in 
this context as the contrary notion of a "hard case" should be evident. Hart notes 
that "it is a matter of some difficulty to give any exhaustive account of what makes 
a 'clear case' clear or makes a general rule obviously and uniquely applicable to 
a particular case." Hart, 6 ENCYC. OF PHILOSOPHY 264, supra note 11, at 270. For 
an example of an elaborate and otherwise intriguing thesis, the plausibility and non• 
triviality of which, however, depend largely on the unexamined notion of what it 
means for legal standards to be "perfectly clearly applicable to particular situations," 
see Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STlJD. 351, 354 (1973) (judges even in 
"easy cases" may not be able to avoid substantive input into the decision). 
43. Compare Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 11 HARV. 
L. REV. 593, 607 (1958), with Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply 
to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REv. 630, 661-69 (1958). For a plausible interpre-
tation of Hart's theory of meaning in this context that does not require excluding 
implicit reference to purpose even in cases appearing to fall within the "standard 
instance" or "core of meaning" of a term, see R. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECI• 
SION 180 n.29 (1961). 
44. Hart, Problems of the Philosophy of Law, supra note 11, at 271. 
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If the solution of easy cases also requires reference beyond the 
language of the rule to the rule's purpose, then either this feature 
cannot by itself be the distinguishing mark of cases that purportedly 
cause the positivist trouble, or Dworkin's argument that the positivist 
cannot account for all relevant legal standards should apply to judicial 
decisions in all cases, easy as well as hard. Consider the second 
alternative. How does the fact that judges must take account of 
purpose as well as language in at least some, and perhaps all, easy 
cases affect the positivist's model? Must the positivist not be prepared 
to identify and count as "law" under his model both the verbal fonnu-
lation of the legal standard and whatever purposes or principles deter-
mine its correct application? 
On this issue, it must be admitted, writers in the positivist tradi-
tion have not always been in agreement. 45 The apparent relative ease 
with which the verbal formulation of a standard can be identified, in 
contrast to the difficulty of isolating the standard's "purpose," has 
tempted theorists to count as "law" only the objectively certain start-
ing point represented by the statute itself. The transition from statute 
to decision in a particular case is then explained as an aspect of legal 
reasoning rather than of the concept of law or of legal validity.46 But 
this view cannot easily escape indictment as essentially definition by 
fiat. Legal reasoning, deductive only in a trivial sense, is primarily a 
matter of determining relevant similarities and differences among fact 
situations that distinguish cases covered by a standard from cases that 
are not. If the critical question of relevance is in fact determined by 
the explicit or implicit purpose of the statute, it seems wholly arbi-
trary to designate only the statute as "legal." More importantly, there 
is no need for the positivist to be concerned that counting purpose as 
law in such cases will impair his master test model. By hypothesis, 
we are dealing with cases in which the same master test that picks out 
the rule also picks out the "explicitly stated or generally agreed" 
45. Hart himself has been less than clear on this issue, although one can suggest 
a consistent interpretation of his writings that has Hart considering "purpose" to 
be law in "easy," but not in "penumbral," cases. Compare Hart, supra note 43, 
at 614, with Hart, Problems of the Philosophy of Law, supra note 11, at 271. Much 
depends, even under this interpretation, on just what is meant by a "penumbral case." 
See Hughes, Rules, Policy and Decision Making, 17 YALE L.J. 411, 4Hi-24 (1968). 
It is not clear, for example, that the only cases in which Hart would agree that a 
uniquely correct decision exists are those that are "easy" in the literal sense. See 
R. WASSERSI'ROM, supra note 43, at 180 n.30. "Easy case" is thus as much a term of 
art for present purposes as "hard case," with neither term necessarily tied to the 
ordinary language meaning of "difficult." Cf. Sartorius, The Justification of the 
Judicial Decision, 78 ETHICS 171, 186 n.3 (1968). 
46. See Christie, Objectivity in the Law, 78 YALE L.J. 1311, 1326-28 (1969); 
cf. Bingham, What ls the Law?, 11 MICH. L. REV. 1, 1-25, 109-21 (1912). 
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purpose, in light of which the rule is to be interpreted and applied.47 
If the positivist's model can accommodate purpose in this manner, 
we must find additional characteristics of the "hard case" if we are to 
explain its distinctive and problematic character. Because the dis-
pute is over the degree of discretion judges have, it may help to recall 
why Hart suggests that judges must sometimes legislate. For Hart, 
the explanation lies in empirical truths about the nature of language 
and the limits of human ability both to anticipate factual develop-
ments and to know precisely what one's aims are in creating legal 
standards. 48 Far from denying the reality of these limitations, Dwor-
kin builds on them. A model of law that captures only legal stan-
dards reflected in the shared conventions of language and purpose 
will require the judge to legislate when those conventions reach the 
described limits. Thus the "hard case" for Dworkin is what might be 
called the "really hard case": the decision that must be reached on the 
basis of standards that, by definition, lead to results inherently uncon-
ventional, inherently controversial, and inherently incapable of 
producing "interpersonal checks"49 as respects the substantive correct-
ness of the result. 
II. THE OBLIGATION OF A JUDGE 
Confronted with standards beyond those obvious in purpose and 
rule, the positivist, says Dworkin, has two choices. He must either 
claim that such standards are only discretionary and hence not legally 
binding, or he may concede their binding status and argue that he 
identifies them as legal standards through reference, in some more 
complex way, to his theoretical master test.50 
There is, however, a third possibility. The positivist might admit 
that some standards bind judges but explain that they play a role in 
the legal system sufficiently different from that of ordinary rules and 
principles to justify excluding them from the class of standards en-
compassed by the concept of "law." This position makes irrelevant 
the question whether such standards could be captured in advance by 
a master test: Even if "capture-proof," they would constitute no 
defect in a theoretical model designed to capture only legal standards. 
41. See Hughes, supra note 45, at 423-24. 
48. See CoNCEPT OF LAW, supra note 2, at 120-24, 131-32. 
49. The term is used by Perry, who suggests that it is the possibility of achieving 
"interpersonal checks" among experts that distinguishes rationality in the formal 
and empirical sciences from attempts at rational justification of judicial decisions 
in "hard cases." See Perry, supra note 36, at 14-15; R. SARTORIUS, INDIVIDUAL CON-
DUCT, supra note 1, at 184. 
50. See Social Rules, supra note 3, at 874. 
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Dworkin insists that arguments of this sort can only beg the question 
in the present context because they assume the very distinction be-
tween legal and other kinds of standards that the positivist's rule of 
recognition is designed to establish. 51 
The aim of the present section is twofold: first, to develop the 
suggested distinction between two kinds of standards that bind 
judges, and, second, to consider whether all standards that bind judges 
must necessarily be deemed "legal" standards. In one sense, Dwor-
kin is correct that the controversy at this point threatens to become 
merely verbal. But there is another, more important sense in which 
the difference between these kinds of standards appears sufficiently 
basic to justify ( as more illuminating) a model of law that preserves, 
rather than dissolves, the distinction. 
A. The Standards That Bind 
At least some of Dworkin's principles exhibit one feature in 
particular that might seem to distinguish them from other legal stan-
dards. Principles appear to function in the first instance as guides to 
the judge in deciding what rules require and only secondarily as guides 
to a citizen's conduct. They seem to guide conduct, if at all, not by 
directly declaring what is and is not permitted, but only in the indirect 
sense of informing an individual that certain principles and policies 
will be considered by courts in determining what a rule requires. 52 
This decision-guiding, rather than conduct-guiding, feature is most 
obvious in the case of principles of statutory construction. It also 
appears to be true, though perhaps less clearly, of such judicial 
maxims and principles as "no man shall profit from his own 
wrong." If principles are controversial, and if equally applicable 
principles may conflict with one another within the context of the 
same decision, it is somewhat strained to suggest that principles guide 
primary conduct in the same way that rules do. 53 
By itself, however, this decision-guiding characteristic will not 
justify a refusal to call all such standards "law." We have agreed, 
after all, that "purposes" must and can be admitted by the positivist to 
be among a system's legal standards, even though such purposes may 
also perform a similar decision-guiding function. If a statute prohib-
iting vehicles in the park is known to be aimed exclusively at promot-
ing an energy conservation ethic, rather than at the preservation of 
51. See id. at 871, 882-90. 
52. See Note, supra note 30, at 940. See also note 85 infra. 
53. This conclusion receives some support from Dworkin's own description of 
principles. See Model of Rules, supra note 3, at 26. 
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peace and quiet, and if that difference in purpose leads to differences 
in interpretation and application, then the purpose guides conduct as 
well as decision for the same basic reason: It supplements the 
meaning of the term "vehicle" in boderline cases to indicate to judge 
and citizen alike just what it is that has been proscribed. 
The decision-guiding function does suggest, however, a possible 
further refinement in the classification of standards that bind 
judges-one that the following rough analogy will serve to introduce. 
Scientists and philosophers of science devote considerable effort to the 
attempt to isolate acceptable "principles of induction" to serve as 
guides or tests for determining when one may properly claim to have 
discovered a "law" of science. 54 In this context it has become 
commonplace to distinguish the principles governing the accepted 
methodology from the substantive results of applying the method-
that is, from the scientific "laws" that govern particular events. 
Would both the accepted methodological principles and the sub-
stantive rules in this case count as scientific "laws"? In one sense 
perhaps they would. Accepted principles of induction might be 
viewed as themselves stating true laws about, for example, the nature 
of knowledge and how it is acquired. The scientific community would 
expect its members to heed these principles as well as already es-
tablished scientific laws in deciding whether a given hypothesis was, 
in fact, a "law." But more important than the fact that both types of 
standards are in this sense "binding" is the fact that the methodologi-
cal and substantive standards apply to areas of human inquiry that in 
important respects are worth distinguishing. 
In similar fashion, some standards in the legal context may be 
viewed as analogous to rules for proper scientific induction because 
they arise out of the investigation of a subject matter that is, in 
important ways, distinct from that with which typical legal standards 
are concerned. The subject matter of the former is not the regulation 
of human behavior in a particular society through the prescription of 
norms, but the regulation of any rational attempt to apply standards 
or to interpret human communications. If principles can be ascribed 
some such trans-legal status-in the sense that they are not peculiarly 
legal-then the claim that they are binding may be accepted, not 
because they are "law," but because they constitute minimally essen-
tial criteria for the proper conduct of certain types of rational activity. 
Such principles become clues, not to what "the law" requires, but to 
54. See generally R. CARNAP, LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PRoBABILl1Y (2d ed. 
1962); N. GOODMAN, FACT, FICTION AND FORECAST (1955); G. VON WRIGIIT, A 
'TREATISE ON INDUCTION AND PROBABILl1Y (1951). 
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what the concept of "rationality" or "judging" requires. To the 
extent that legal systems require officials to be "judges," one discovers 
what that role entails, not only by inspecting particular provisions of 
the legal system (polling the system's officials to determine what they 
contingently happen to accept), but also by paying attention simply 
to what it means to apply standards rationally in a sense that tran-
scends the particular context in which the role is assumed. 
Which standards are candidates for such translegal status and what 
characteristics identify them? Our description of them as standards 
implicit in the concept of "judging" provides a starting point for 
answering the second half of the question: Standards binding on a 
judge are to be distinguished from legal standards if they are immune 
from deliberate change in the sense that an instruction to an official to 
ignore them makes the official no longer a "judge." While the task of 
defining the concept of judging may not be easier than the task of 
defining the concept of law, my only purpose at present is to suggest 
that some standards fall into this category, whether or not we can 
identify them all. They would include those principles referring to 
"characteristic judicial virtues" that Hart identifies as "impartiality 
and neutrality in surveying the alternatives, consideration for the 
interest of all who will be affected, and a concern that some acceptable 
general principle be deployed as a reasoned basis for decision."55 
They would also include, perhaps as a particular illustration of the 
last-named virtue, the principle of non-contradiction, reflected in the 
requirement that "like cases be treated alike." Dworkin insists that 
judges are subject to a strong requirement of "articulate consis-
tency."56 The source of the obligation even for Dworkin is not appar-
ently the law, but a "doctrine of political responsibility."57 It is not 
clear, however, that Dworkin means to suggest that the obligation is 
only "political," and thus subject to cultural variation or normative 
dispute, rather than, as the writings of Professor Lon Fuller suggest, 
an essential aspect of the concept of adjudication itself. 58 If to 
instruct judges to decide cases by flipping coins is to make them no 
longer judges, but agents of a legislative determination that any 
decision, right or wrong, is better than none, 59 it is hard to see that 
55. See CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 2, at 200. 
56. See Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1064. 
57. Id. 
58. See L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication (1959) (unpublished 
paper prepared for the Roundtable on Jurisprudence, Association of American Law 
Schools); Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963 Wis. L. REv. 3. 
59. See H.M. Hart & A.M. Sacks, The Legal Process 666 (tent. ed. 1958) (un-
published). 
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one does less violence to the concept of adjudication by instructing 
judges to ignore the demand for articulate consistency. 
The process of distinguishing these standards (let us call them 
judicial technique principles) from other legal standards may be 
illustrated by considering one particular group of such 
standards: the maxims of statutory construction. Despite the tend-
ency to debunk canons of construction as effectively cancelling each 
other, one may agree with H. M. Hart and Sacks that they at least 
perform the "useful function" of indicating "linguistically permissi-
ble" meanings, with final selection left to context. 00 In this respect, 
such maxims perform nicely the role Dworkin assigns to prin-
ciples: They point, however weakly, in one direction while still 
leaving final results to await a complete stocktaking of all such 
pointers. Dworkin, in any event, appears explicitly to include such 
"techniques of statutory construction" among his putatively trouble-
causing principles. 61 It is not necessary to canvass in depth elaborate 
textbook listings and discussions of these maxims in order to make 
the point that the source of many of them lies in "logic and common 
sense"62 rather than in the contingently accepted norms of a particu-
lar society. This is particularly evident in the case of the three most 
commonly cited canons: noscitur a sociis, ejusdam generis, and 
expressio uni us est exclusio alterius. 63 The fact that standard treatises, 
themselves venerable, reach this conclusion about the common-
sense origin of hoary Latin maxims64 is a testament not so much to the 
early emergence of such principles in Anglo-American law, as to their 
fundamental link to the prerequisites of rational interpretation in any 
context and in any society. As such they are easily viewed, not as 
peculiarly legal principles, but as principles belonging to a "science of 
hermeneutics" that prescribes a methodology for interpretation in 
general, whether the subject be suicide notes, Dead Sea scrolls, wills 
or statutes: 
[W]e shall find that the same rules which common sense teaches 
every one to use, in order to understand his neighbor in the most 
trival intercourse, are necessary likewise, although not sufficient, for 
the interpretation of documents and texts of the highest importance, 
constitutions as well as treaties between the greatest nations. 66 
60. Id. at 1221. 
61. See Model of Rules, supra note 3, at 42. 
62. BROOM'S LEGAL MAXIMS 453 (10th ed. 1939). 
63. See H. READ, J. MACDONALD, J. FORDHAM & W.J. PIERCE, MATERIALS ON 
LEGISLATION 903 (1973). 
64. See J. SumERLAND, STATUTORY CoNSTRUCTION § 4916 (3d ed. Horack 1943). 
65. F. LIE.BER, LEGAL AND PoLmCAL HBRMBNBUllCS 17-18 (3d ed. 1880). 
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Not all such maxims, however, will appear to exhibit the suggested 
identifying feature of immunity from deliberate change. Maxims 
directing strict construction of criminal statutes or of statutes in 
derogation of the common law, for example, appear context-specific 
to particular legal systems in ways apparently open to cultural varia-
tion. To explain why some of these precepts might nevertheless be 
viewed as standards arising out of the role of judge qua judge rather 
than out of the peculiarly legal standards of the system in which one 
occupies that role requires a further distinction between the concrete 
shape a principle has assumed in a particular legal society and the 
abstract "principle of interpretation" it represents. The abstract 
principle that the common-law derogation maxim represents may be 
phrased in some such manner as the following: "Assume settled prac-
tices and expectations have not been radically and deliberately altered, 
unless . . . ( the context, language, other principles so indicate)." 
The concrete form of the abstract principle is context-specific to a 
common-law jurisdiction, but the abstract principle is not. It is a 
common sense guide to rational interpretation that would normally 
be accepted in any context. Its justification lies in assumptions about 
human behavior that are grounded in reason and experience and that 
transcend particular community norms. One who intends sharply 
to change known, accepted patterns of behavior will normally take 
care to make his instructions precise; where instructions are imprecise, 
he probably did not intend the radical interpretation. 
Having made this distinction, one may still be unpersuaded that 
deliberate countermand of the common-law derogation maxim, how-
ever clear its origin in common sense, would essentially undermine 
the concept of judging in those cases where the maxim would other-
wise apply. No less eminent an authority than Holmes, for example, 
urged that the maxim be eliminated from American jurisprudence, 66 
and numerous state legislatures have in fact enacted statutes specific-
ally purporting to abrogate it. 67 For the most part, however, these 
attacks appear to have been leveled at misuse of the canon-at 
judicial decisions that found the canon to be more than simply the 
abstract principle of interpretation described above. Such decisions 
implicitly viewed the canon as reflecting a substantive principle of 
power allocation between legislature and judiciary that gave the latter 
institution control over development of the common law in the face of 
66. See Holmes, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REv. 383, 386-88 
(1908). 
67. For a survey of such states and resulting court reaction, see Fordham & 
Leach, Interpretation of Statutes in Derogation of the Common Law, 3 VANP. L. 
REV. 438, 448-53 (1950). 
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superior, countervailing indicia of intended legislative change. But if 
one restricts the role of the maxim to the minimum function described 
by the abstract principle of interpretation, it then becomes diffi-
cult to reconcile legislative abrogation with a continued expectation 
that the court perform an exclusively judicial role in cases where the 
maxim would otherwise apply. One might even have difficulty 
knowing how to comply with an instruction that no presumption, 
however weak, should henceforth be made in favor of interpretations 
that more nearly accord with prior, accepted practice. 08 If the 
instruction is viewed as tantamount to a direction not to use common 
sense in interpreting communications-"do not assume the legislator 
in communicating directives acts as experience indicates most rational 
people do"-it becomes doubtful whether the "interpreting" official 
remains a "judge" any more than he would when acting on an 
instruction to resolve doubtful cases by flipping a coin.00 
Contrast the second maxim mentioned above-that "criminal stat-
utes should be strictly construed." Here it is difficult to see how our 
suggested identifying feature-immunity from deliberate change-
would justify assigning the maxim binding but translegal status. If 
the abstract principle represented is thought to reflect solely a policy of 
providing fair notice concerning acts that will result in criminal 
sanctions, then it can be discovered only by inspecting community or 
legal norms concerning fairness, not judicial norms concerning tech-
niques of rule interpretation and application. If a particular commu-
nity decided no longer to value fair warning in issuing and enforcing 
criminal statutes, the maxim could be intelligibly and deliberately 
countermanded. One could establish a translegal status for such a 
68. Presumably, prior practice is maintained, despite the instruction, until it is 
overturned by statutes. Some statutes will intend "sharp" changes and some will 
not, with the line between the two, despite the instruction, still marked (in part) 
by language that avoids ambiguity. Cf. Niblock v. Salt Lake City, 100 Utah 573, 
111 P.2d 800 (1941) (adhering to previous "strict" construction of statute in deroga-
tion of common law despite intervening legislative reversal of derogation canon). 
The only context in which repeal of presumptions of any kind in favor of established 
practices might be understandable is one in which it appears that the law-making 
institution thereby intends total disavowal of the relevance of existing practices as 
"background" against which to understand and interpret future directives, as in the 
case of a postrevolutionary committee. Even in that case, however, one can prob-
ably explain different interpretations of apparently identical pre- and postrevolution-
ary directives simply by noting, if true, that fundamental changes in societal goals 
have led to "other indicia" of intent or purpose that outweigh presumptions in favor 
of continuity. Only if one thinks it is possible "rationally" to declare irrelevant 
all respects in which background human behavior converges, can one strip the pre-
sumption of all weight, leaving judges to interpret on a totally clean slate. 
69. Cf. H.M. Hart, & A.M. Sacks, supra note 59, at 1240 (a "statute ought al-
ways to be presumed to be the work of reasonable men pursuing reasonable purposes 
reasonably"). 
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maxim only to the extent one views it as reflecting an abstract 
principle of interpretation rather than substantive community goals-
for example, "communicators who intend serious consequences to 
attach to actions will avoid ambiguity; where they did not avoid, they 
probably did not intend." 
B. Whether All That Binds Is Law 
Does a refusal to include among a society's "legal standards" 
those principles that are immune from deliberate change in the sense 
described amount simply to a verbal dispute, a definition of law "by 
fiat"?70 Dworkin rejects out-of-hand any attempt to explain the obliga-
tion to take principles into account 
as a matter of judicial "craft," or something of that sort. The ques-
tion will still remain why this type of obligation (whatever we call 
it) is different from the obligation that rules impose upon judges, and 
why it entitles us to say that principles and policies are not part of 
the law but are merely extra-legal standards "courts characteristically 
use."71 
The above discussion essays an answer to this question based on 
differences in the source and character of judicial technique principles 
corresponding to the difference between standards that bind a judge 
qua judge and those that bind qua judge of a particular legal system.72 
In one sense, of course, Dworkin is correct. Because the role of 
judge is itself assigned by the law, principles implicit in the concept of 
judging become incorporated in the legal system by reference. Fur-
thermore, if judicial technique principles are too numerous to list and 
too unrelated to be generated from a formula, as we have assumed for 
purposes of argument, 73 then it must be false to claim that "some 
70. See Model of Rules, supra note 3, at 37. 
71. Id. at 36.' 
72. By suggesting that standards can bind "qua judge," I mean to imply that 
judging occurs in nonlegal contexts and that, in all such contexts, observance of 
a core of common minimal standards makes it appropriate to speak of the official 
engaged in the activity as a judge, whether it be of beauty contests, see Greenawalt, 
supra note 10, at 368-69, of games, compare CoNCEPT OF LAW, supra note 2, at 
138-41, with Judicial Discretion, supra note 3, at 629, or of the law. I do not mean 
to deny that judges in legal systems may also be obliged to heed additional stan-
dards of judging technique that are peculiar to their role as legal judges. See Hughes, 
supra note 45, at 414-16. 
In its broadest sense, "judging" need not be confined to acts of officials resolving 
disputes but may include any attempt of an individual to reach and justify decisions 
(make "judgments") under standards. See Model of Rules, supra note 3, at 33 (ser-
geant told to "pick the five most experienced men" for a patrol). In this sense, 
what the text refers to as standards implicit in the concept of judging might be char-
acterized equally well as standards implicit in the concept of rationality. Cf. Perry, 
supra note 36. 
73. If one thinks that judicial technique principles can be easily listed or other-
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social rule or set of social rules exists within the community of [a 
nation's] judges and legal officials, which rules settle the limits of the 
judge's duty to recognize any other rules or principle as law."74 
If all of this is conceded, in what sense could one continue to 
defend a model of law that ignored judicial technique principles in 
the account it gave of legal validity? The answer lies in part in the 
characteristics implied by the shared identifying feature of immunity 
from deliberate change. It is the peculiar characteristic of principles 
identified by this feature that they can be constructed in advance by 
an external observer, bent on determining "the laws" of a particular 
legal system, without regard for empirical questions concerning the 
existence or content of any legal standard in the society, including the 
rule of recognition. It is this claimed universality and independence 
of judicial technique principles that justifies excluding such standards 
in a model designed primarily to isolate a society's particular legal 
norms. Exclusion is justified for much the same reasons that one 
would not include the rules of grammar or language of the society in a 
model of "law," even though these too would be "binding'' on a judge 
responsive to his obligation to understand and apply the signs used to 
convey legal standards. 
Another way of making the point is to note that we are doing no 
more than separating a judge's obligation "to apply the law" into its 
constituent parts: the obligation (1) "to apply" (2) "the law." The 
second half is what the positivist's model is designed to reflect. The 
first half-the realm of standards that determine acceptable methods 
of interpreting and applying other standards and of deciding particu-
lar cases under such standards-is not the peculiar concern of the 
legal theorist. It is the concern as well of the theorist in any discipline, 
from philosophy to science, who must deal with the perplexing prob-
lems involved in the characterization and classification of fact situa-
tions and the justification of decisions under standards. 75 One need 
not deny that real diferences may exist in the concept of rationality as 
it applies to these various disciplines in order to affirm that there is a 
common core that conscientious judges must heed for reasons quite 
wise captured, the positivist could, of course, save his model without recourse to 
the argument in this section. I ignore this possibility because Dworkin apparently 
treats these standards as among the principles that cannot be so captured and be-
cause the distinction urged in this section seems to me worth preserving even if 
other arguments for the positivist might also be made. 
14. Social Rules, supra note 3, at 869; see id. at 874. That the social rule thesis 
quoted in the text may be a stronger claim than the positivist need make is noted 
below. See note 131 infra and accompanying text. 
75. Cf. R. WASSERSTROM, supra note 43, at 32. 
January 1977] Hart/Dworkin Dispute 497 
different from those that explain why judges must also heed the 
standards identified by a contingently accepted rule of recognition. 
The plea, in short, is for a distinction, also urged by others, 76 
between the concept of legal reasoning and the concept of legal 
validity. Dworkin suggests that the question "What, in general is a 
good reason for decision by a court of law?" is in every respect simply 
another way of asking "What is Law?"77 The view presented here 
declines as misleading this invitation to collapse all questions concern-
ing how courts ought to decide cases into questions of what the law is. 
This viewpoint also explains why Hart might write an entire book on 
the concept of law and explicitly set aside, as a matter "that cannot be 
attempted here," the characterization of "the varied types of reasoning 
which courts characteristically use .... "78 It may be that of these 
two, the inquiry into legal reasoning is the more urgent and of more 
immediate, practical effect than the conceptual study of legal validity. 
It may even be that the perceived barrenness of conceptual theories of 
law in general justifies a view that finds more fertile possibilities in 
the American realist movement, 79 whatever the conceptual flaws of the 
legal theory produced by that movement.80 But these normative 
evaluations are beside the point when the question concerns potential 
defects in the conceptual enterprise upon which Hart, after all, chose 
to embark. 
The importance of distinguishing what are here called judicial 
technique principles does not, however, lie solely in the implications 
of the distinction for an adequate conceptual model of law. The 
distinction has implications as well for questions concerning the 
responsibility of individual judges to develop and correct such princi-
ples within an existing legal system. In the case of legal standards, 
individual judges who disagree with the justice or wisdom of the 
accepted rule of recognition do not breach-and indeed can only 
acquit-their duty qua judge by applying such standards. On the 
positivist's model, compliance with accepted standards is compliance 
with official duty. In contrast, official acceptance of particular 
judicial technique principles has no necessary connection to questions 
concerning the correctness of such standards and the obligation of a 
judge to employ them. An individual judge demonstrates compli-
ance with official duty as respects these principles, not by pointing to 
the fact of convergent peer behavior, but only by pointing to the 
76. See Hughes, supra note 45, at 433. 
77. Dworkin, Wasserstrom, The Judicial Decision, 15 Ennes 47 (1964). 
78. CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 2, at 144. 
79. See Hughes, supra note 45, at 437-39. 
80. ~ee CoNCEPT OF LAw, supra note 2, at 143. 
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correctness in fact of the judicial technique principles he employs. 
And in establishing such correctness, the search for guidance must 
ultimately be directed well beyond the community of legal officials to 
the wider community of rational rule-appliers. 
That much needs to be done in further characterizing and identi-
fying such principles may be conceded. 81 The point of the present 
discussion is only to stress that, to the extent the judge's role is that of 
a rational rule-applier, the resulting implications for role theory 
should not be subsumed under legal theory in a way that obscures 
real differences in the nature and source of judicial obligation. 82 
Llewellyn's elaborate exploration of "rule, tool and technique"83 in 
the process of judicial decision should not, under the rights thesis, be 
converted into an exploration of exclusively legal standards: rule 
and tool perhaps, but not technique. • 
C. The Limits of the Argument 
Even if the above distinction is accepted, it will constitute a 
complete response to Dworkin's argument only if it can be applied to 
all of the principles Dworkin has in mind. Consider the principle 
that "no man should profit from his own wrong." On its face, this at 
least appears to be a standard unrelated to any independently devel-
oped methodology of rule-discovery that might be thought to tran-
scend the realm of the peculiarly legal. Dworkin suggests that we 
can imagine the standard being changed or eroded "[i]f it no longer 
seemed unfair to allow people to profit by their wrongs. "84 Can one 
justify a refusal to count this standard as law by a process similar to 
that applied to judicial technique principles? 
81. See Hughes, supra note 45, at 439 & n.22. It may be that there are char-
acteristics other than those suggested in this section that more appropriately identify 
the full class of judicially binding standards deserving of exclusion from the class 
of "legal standards." My primary concern is to describe the general nature of this 
class of standards and to justify its separation from inquiries into legal validity. 
The leading reference point for studies characterizing what is peculiar and essen-
tial to the process of adjudication is still largely found in the writings of Professor 
Fuller. See sources cited note 58 supra; H.M. Hart & A.M. Sacks, supra note 59, 
at 662-69. For a thoughtful application of Fuller's model to questions of legal the-
ory, see Weiler, Two Models of Judicial Decision-Making, 46 CAN. BAR REV. 406 
(1968). 
82. Philosophers and sociologists have long explored the extent to which obliga-
tions attach to, and define, roles, see, e.g., R. DAHRBNDORF, EssAYS IN THE THEORY 
OF SocIE'IY 19-87 (1968), and this literature is to some extent reflected in discussions 
of legal theory and legal reasoning, see Weiler, supra note 81, at 407 n.3 (1968), 
See also Seidman, The Judicial Process Reconsidered in the Light of Role-Theory, 
32 Moo. L. RBv. 516 (1969). 
83, See K. LLEWELLYN, THE CoMMON LAW TRADmoN: DECIDING APPEALS 402 
(1960). 
84. Model of Rules, supra note 3, at 41. 
January 1977] Hart/Dworkin Dispute 499 
The attempt to do so might take the following form. First, one 
might question whether in fact the "no-profit" principle could be 
disavowed as Dworkin suggests. If the principle is a concrete illus-
tration of some more abstract principle, linking notions of right and 
wrong with notions of just desert ("good should be rewarded, evil 
punished"), the suggestion that the principle could have no weight at 
all in community judgments about "fairness" borders on a redefini-
tion of the underlying normative concepts of "desert," "right," 
"wrong" and "profit." It will always be prima facie unfair to profit 
from one's own wrong, even though the prima facie case can some-
times, as in Dworkin's example of adverse possession, be overcome. 
Second, even if complete disavowal of the no-profit maxim is logically 
possible, it might be argued that the maxim (or the abstract principle 
it reflects) operates on such a level of generality that one could 
assume implicit acceptance of the principle as an empirical fact in any 
relevant social context. In this respect, such principles would resem-
ble judicial technique principl~: They are found not in the confines 
of a particular legal institution but in the essential preconditions of 
social intercourse in general. 
If this hypothesis is correct, one should be able to discover the 
"no-profit" maxim and similar principles operating in nonlegal, rule-
governed situations-in games, for example. Consider a referee at a 
basketball game played under rules that predate the introduction of 
specific provisions for intentional fouls. The generally applicable 
rule is that all bodily contact fouls "shall be called." A member of 
team A, which is losing in the closing minutes of the game, intention-
ally fouls the poorest shooter on team B with the hope that team A 
will get the rebound if the foul shot is missed. Team B urges that the 
rule be construed to allow the referee not to call the foul, thereby 
leaving team B with possession of the ball. No other relevant rules 
govern the situation, which has not previously arisen. One can 
imagine the referee deciding that, although the rules committee had 
not envisioned this particular situation, surely it had not intended for 
a team to "profit from its own wrong."85 Whether or not that is the 
85. Professor Carrio discusses a similar example involving the "advantage rule" 
in soccer, which allows officials to avoid penalizing a team's infraction of a rule 
"if, as a consequence of the penalty, the offending side would gain an advantage 
and the non-offending side would be adversely affected." G. CARRIO, LEGAL PRINCI-
PLES AND LEGAL PosmVIsM 6 ( 1971). Carrio uses the example to distinguish be-
tween second-order and first-order principles, the former characterized in part by 
their "topic neutrality" and in part by the fact that they are addressed to judges 
and indicate how other rules are to be understood and applied. But Carrio's second-
order principles appear to include far more than what I have called judicial technique 
principles, and both sorts of principles appear for Carrio to be legal standards. See 
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conclusion the referee reaches, the claim that he has a duty at least to 
consider the "no-profit" principle rests on assumptions about how 
critics and players would respond to a failure "to take the measure of 
these principles" that are similar to the assumptions Dworkin makes 
in arguing for the binding nature of the principle in Riggs. 86 In both 
cases a decisionmaker is urged to construe a rule, in the absence of 
express contrary indications, not to do violence to implicitly accepted 
general social principles. Although in that sense "binding," the 
context-neutral nature of such principles might be thought sufficient 
to explain why one does not include them specifically among the 
"rules of basketball" or the "laws" of society.87 
I do not intend to explore this suggestion further because it seems 
clear that, however far one might push this process of distinguishing 
trans-legal from legal principles, one cannot in this manner account 
id. at 7, 16, 24. Thus the distinction is different both in content and purpose from 
the distinction developed in this article. 
86 . .See Model of Rules, supra note 3, at 36. 
87. This attempt to extend the argument used in the case of judicial technique 
principles can be placed in perspective by briefly comparing the thesis of this sec-
tion with classical theories of natural law and with Hart's own theory concerning 
the "minimum content of natural law." For Hart, natural facts of human vulnerabil-
ity, desire for survival, and the like, make minimal rules respecting persons, property, 
and promises necessary features of all social life. See CONCEPT OF LAw, supra note 
2, at 189-95. Legal systems must include such minimal rules, not so they may count 
as "legal", but because it is unlikely that such systems could otherwise come into 
being or survive. The link here is an empirical one between universal but contingent 
truths about human beings on the one hand, and the efficacy, not the concept, of a 
legal system on the other. One would hardly be inclined to exclude these minimally 
necessary legal standards (which may take various concrete forms in particular 
legal systems) from a model of law simply because they appeared only in this 
sense in all legal systems. In this respect, the difference between such standards 
and judicial technique principles lies in part in the difference in subject matter with 
which they deal. Minimal rules concerning persons, property, and promises aim 
directly at the control of human conduct, rather than at control of the process of 
reasoning from standards to decisions in particular cases. It is the thesis of this 
section that the former enterprise, but not the latter, is what "law," even in its 
broadest, preanalytic sense, could possibly be said to be "about." Cf. L. FULLER, 
THE MORALITY OF LAW 106 (1964). This thesis explains why a model of law 
that failed to reflect "the minimum content of natural law" would seem arbitrary 
in a way that a model that ignored judicial technique principles would not. For 
similar reasons, classical natural law theories, which assert conceptual links between 
"law" and substantive principles of justice or morality, would also require that such 
principles be included among the "legal standards" identified by legal theory. 
The attempt in the text to provide a trans-legal account of principles such as 
the "no profit maxim" falls between the Hartian and the classical natural law theo-
ries. Like the latter, such principles are not limited to those based on the "natural 
necessity" reflected in a Hobbesian view of man's predicament, but embrace broader 
principles of fairness and justice generally in social contexts. Like Hart's theory, 
the claim that these principles would be universally accepted in any social context 
is only contingent, not conceptual. (Indeed the plausibility of even the contingent 
claim probably depends on interpreting the principles at a level so abstract that they 
threaten to become vacuous.) But like both theories, an attempt to exclude such 
substantive standards from a model of "legal standards" begins to appear arbitrary. 
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for all, or even most, of the principles that Dworkin has in mind. 
Some principles are surely not context-neutral. A principle that 
places "special burdens upon oligopolies that manufacture potentially 
dangerous machines"88 derives its authority from standards accepted 
within the particular legal institution in much the same manner as 
other legal standards. A referee urged to apply the foul rule only to 
intentional fouls must consider the purpose and "spirit" of the partic-
ular game of basketball (it is not a kind of football or rugby) in order 
to reject the proposed interpretation. The fact that one would not 
include in the "rules of basketball" all the purposes and aims of the 
game that might become relevant to an interpretation of the rules 
provides no answer to Dworkin's argument that at least these princi-
ples operate functionally like other legal standards to determine re-
sults, and thus in that sense are institution-specific standards that 
must be included in an accurate theoretical account of the "laws" of 
the game or institution. 
III. THE RIGHTS THESIS 
What, then, should a judge do when the shared conventions of 
language and purpose alone do not point to a single result? Dwor-
kin's answer is that the judge must expand his search beyond •the legal 
standards implicit in any particular rule to those implicit in the entire 
legal system itself: "A principle is a principle of law if it figures in 
the soundest theory of law that can be provided as a justification for 
the explicit substantive and institutional rules of the jurisdiction in 
question."80 Professor Sartorius provides a similar but not identical 
account: "The correct decision in a given case is that which achieves 
'the best resolution' of existing standards in terms of systematic 
coherence .... "90 
In his most recent article, Dworkin expand~ at length on this 
thesis by positing an ideal judge called Hercules.91 Faced with a 
hard constitutional case, Hercules must first develop a "full political 
theory that justifies the constitution as a whole." If several political 
theories satisfy this test, he must refer to other constitutional rules and 
settled practices under the rules to select the theory that "provides a 
smoother fit with the constitutional scheme as a whole." By this 
process, he develops a theory of the Constitution "in the shape of a 
88. Model of Rules, supra note 3, at 41. 
89. Social Rules, supra note 3, at 876. 
90. R. SARTORIUS, INDIVIDUAL CoNDUCT, supra note 1, at 196; Sartorius, supra 
note 13, at 15·8. 
91, See Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1083, 
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complex set of principles and policies that justify that scheme of gov-
ernment," and by reference to which he is now able to decide the hard 
constitutional issue in the case before him. 02 The same process is 
applicable to cases involving statutes and the common law. Hercules 
must "construct a scheme of abstract and concrete principles that 
provide a coherent justification for all common law precedents and, 
so far as these are to be justified on principle, constitutional and 
statutory provisions as well."93 
Dworkin's dual claim that this search for the "soundest" solu-
tion to a hard case not only accurately describes the Anglo-Ameri-
can judicial function but will also yield a single correct decision in 
every case faces theoretical, empirical, and practical objections. In 
the remainder of this article, I briefly discuss these difficulties without 
attempting to resolve them, and then consider whether the rights 
thesis, even if valid, can be accommodated to the positivist's basic 
model. 
A. Assessing the Thesis 
1. Theoretical Problems 
Any attempt to assess the above claims confronts at the outset the 
problem of understanding just what is meant, in the present context, 
by "coherence" or by "a soundest theory of law." Dworkin and 
Sartorius, however, have done much to try to clarify these notions, 
and I shall not expand on their efforts here. 04 Even if one under-
stands what is required of a judge trying to apply the rights thesis, the 
plausibility of the thesis would still be difficult to test because of the 
clear separation of the claim that there is always a single right answer 
from the claim that any mere mortal could be expected to know that 
he had found it. Only Hercules can do that, as Dworkin illustrates. oti 
Indeed, Sartorius goes so far as to admit "that it is unreasonable to 
expect that it would be possible, even in principle, to develop some 
form of judicial proof procedure which would permit one to demon-
strate the correctness, let alone the unique correctness, of a putatively 
correct decision in all cases."96 
These merely practical problems, however, prove the claim theo-
retically untenable only if one holds a theory of truth that makes the 
92. Id. at 1084-85. 
93. Id. at 1094. 
94. For a further examination and critique of the notion of a "soundest theory 
of law," see Note, Dworkin's Rights Thesis, 14 MICH. L. R.Bv. 1167 (1976). 
95. See Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1083-101. 
96. R. SARTORIUS, INDIVIDUAL CONDUCT, supra note 1, at 201. 
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testability of a claim a precondition of its meaningfulness. Let us 
assume that claims can be true though they are unprovable "even in 
principle."07 We can then also agree with Sartorius that uniquely 
correct decisions for legal cases exist if the following conditions are 
met: (1) There is a unique set of exclusively relevant legal stan-
dards that bear on the issue. (2) These standards have relative weights 
for use in cases of conflict. (3) Some method exists for resolving ties 
when conflicting standards are evenly balanced. 98 
Of these three conditions, Sartorius acknowledges a theoretical 
problem only in connection with the third:- One has no guarantee 
that cases will not arise in which conflicting principles are evenly 
balanced. Sartorius' response is that this possibility is so unlikely that 
the theoretical model remains a viable hypothetical model for the 
judge and justifies his search for the correct answer in all cases.~9 The 
second condition-that unique, pre-established weights attach to the 
pluralistic and undoubtedly conflicting institutional standards one is 
likely to discover in any hard case--is more troublesome. Several 
commentators have argued that this aspect of the claim is unproved 
and implausible.100 Sartorius, for example, simply asserts at this 
point in the argument that the same test of institutional support 
that isolates the relevant standards will also reveal their relative 
weights.101 Again, the problem does not seem to lie with the theoret-
97. See id. at 185: "[l]t is clear that, in mathematics, we have learned 
that truth cannot be equated with provability." 
98. See id. at 189-99. 
99. Compare Sartorius, supra note 13, at 158-59, with R. SARTORIUS, INDIVIDUAL 
CONDUCT, supra note 1, at 199-204. This response, of course, concedes that the 
theoretical validity of the model cannot be established, however "rarely" one might 
suppose evenly balanced cases will occur. As one commentator notes, what may 
be "rare" in comparison to the totality of cases--easy and hard-may not be rare 
at all if "hard cases" alone are considered. See Note, supra note 94, at 1193. 
At this point, the argument over whether judges should accept the model, despite 
the theoretical imperfections, shifts to the level of normative legal theory. See note 
4 supra. The proponent of the rights thesis anchors his normative claims primarily 
in considerations drawn from the role of a judge in a democracy and from the per-
ceived unfairness of "retroactive" resolutions of social disputes. An opponent of 
the thesis might agree with Llewellyn that the "single right answer" view "tends, 
along with pressure of work and human avoidance of sweat, to encourage taking 
the first seemingly workable road which [appears], thus giving the more familiar an 
edge up on the more wise." K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 83, at 25. Note that this 
normative dispute results from focusing on the impact of the rights thesis on judges 
at opposite ends of the spectrum from "easy" to "hard" cases. Judges who strike 
"new" ground in "hard cases" may find shelter in the thesis from accusations that 
judges are merely legislating their own personal views; but they do so arguably only 
at the cost of being too quick to decide in other cases that they are in fact dealing 
with an "easy" case. 
100. See MacCallum, Dworkin on Judicial Discretion, 60 J. PmL. 638, 640 
(1963); Christie, supra note 10, at 656; Raz, supra note 10, at 846. 
101. See R. SARTORIUS, INDIVIDUAL CONDUCT, supra note 1, at 193. 
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ical claim that all institutional standards relevant to a decision will 
have fixed, relative weights at any point in time, but only with the 
likelihood that any procedure can be developed to reveal those 
weights. In this respect, the thesis is perhaps best viewed, as far as its 
theoretical validity is concerned, as a sketch of the hypothetical 
framework implied by judicial opinions that are written as if the 
decision in a hard case were uniquely required, much as Kelsen's 
theory may be viewed as an attempt to describe what must be 
hypothesized if one is to explain the normative aspect of law .102 
There remains, however, one problem that has been largely over-
looked. In fact, the problem arises in connection with what has 
apparently been assumed to be the most plausible aspect of the 
thesis: -the assumption that a unique set of pre-existing, decision-
relevant legal standards exists in every case. Elaboration of the 
problem requires brief reference once again to Fuller's writings on the 
nature of adjudication, referred to earlier in this article, in a different 
context.103 Fuller's view is that some kinds of disputes are inherently 
inappropriate for resolution through adjudicative methods. The ex-
planation for and description of what constitutes these "limits of 
adjudication" is varied and sometimes obscure, with the "polycen-
tric" nature of the issue usually serving as the predominant sign that 
the limits have been reached.104 On one interpretation of this model, 
what makes some problems nonjusticiable is the absence of the 
pre-existing standards upon which rational, judicial decisionmaking 
depends.105 
Now Sartorius explicitly draws on Fuller's theory of adjudication 
in developing the rights thesis as an apparent explication of the 
concept of adjudication.106 Dworkin explicitly characterizes the 
thesis in its descriptive aspect as explaining "the present structure 
of the institution of adjudication."107 If the rights thesis indeed 
102. See note 6 supra. 
103. lSee sources cited note 58 supra. 
104. "A polycentric problem is one which has many centres of stress and direc-
tion of force, only some of which are likely to be the focus of attention when a 
decision in the area is made .... " Weiler, supra note 81, at 423. 
105. Id. at 420-21. "Polycentricity" does not seem to mean the same thing as 
"lacking pre-existing decisional standards." As Fuller uses the term, polycentricity 
seems to imply just the opposite-namely, that there are too many inter-related and 
decision-relevant standards to allow a court to manage them all in the adjudicative 
setting. Thus, it is not clear that polycentric issues would cause Dworkin's Hercules 
any problem, or, correspondingly, that Dworkin would concede that any issues are 
inherently nonjusticiable. See text at notes 118-20 infra & note 119 infra. 
106. R. SARTORIUS, INDIVIDUAL CONDUCT, supra note 1, at 168 (emphasis origi-
nal). 
107. See Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1101. 
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amounts to an explication of the concept of judging, and if it is true 
that some problems can arise that are inherently nonjusticiable for 
lack of pre-existing decisional standards, then the validity of the claim 
that there is a single right answer in every case depends, even in 
theory, on a further empirical investigation into the kind and range of 
jobs we have, in fact, given to courts.108 One may, of course, hope 
that courts have themselves properly applied doctrines of justiciability 
to limit the cases they accept to those with pre-existing decisional 
standards. But neither Dworkin nor Sartorius undertakes any such 
investigation. Courts may, after all, have made mistakes in applying 
justiciability doctrines. And although mistakes made by judges 
about the legally required result in normal cases leave untouched the 
claim that there was a right answer, mistakes in deciding what is 
justiciable leave the courts dealing with "polycentric" cases as to 
which the claim of single right answer is, by definition, false.109 
Furthermore, apart from the question of mistakes, not all state courts, 
let alone English courts, adhere to doctrines of justiciability similar to 
those that have been applied in federal courts. To the extent that the 
single-right-answer thesis is meant to apply to all cases heard by 
Anglo-American courts, its validity will again depend upon empirical 
investigations yet to be undertaken by proponents of the thesis. 
The rights thesis advocate might, of course, reply that the single 
right answer claim applies only to those cases in which the deciding 
official is acting qua judge. But this response makes the thesis 
considerably less interesting. One may accept the rights thesis as an 
explication of the ideal embraced by the concept of adjudication and 
still be left with the problem of determining which of the cases that 
come before courts are compatible with that ideal. One cannot draw 
the line between these two kinds of cases on the basis of "those that 
do and those that do not have pre-existing standards and right 
answers," for that is precisely what is in question. 
Clearly, much depends on how broad a claim is being made for 
the single-right-answer ("no discretion") thesis. Dworkin at one 
point appeared to exclude constitutional cases from the reach of the 
thesis110 and at other times seems to have limited the common-law 
claim to the standard kinds of civil cases that courts customarily 
108. See generally MacCallum, supra note 100, at 640. 
109. By deciding a nonjusticiable case a court may, of course, by that very act 
(and the accompanying articulation of standards) make future such cases justiciable, 
although one is still left with an unavoidable instance of judicial legislation in the 
first decision. 
110. See Judicial Discretion, supra note 3, at 634 n.6. But see Hard Cases, supra 
note 3, at 1083-85; Greenawalt, supra note 10, at 375 n.46. 
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handle.111 Depending on what counts as a "typical civil case," one 
might support the proposition that these at least fall into the class of 
the justiciable. But if legislative instructions to courts to decide 
matters that are not justiciable ( or the voluntary acceptance by courts 
of such matters) are automatically disqualified as counterexamples to 
the thesis on the ground that they are not the sort of cases to which 
the claim applies, then the thesis again threatens to become as inter-
esting as a tautology. 
One can, perhaps, avoid these problems by looking for the limits 
of the thesis in the context of the dispute out of which it arose in the 
first place. Dworkin, after all, is talking about "hard cases"-those 
for which the positivist admits there are standards that can lead to 
only one result in some cases, but not in all. Dworkin's claim might 
be that if there are any admitted standards, then the solution to the 
case is always determined: once justiciable, then always and thor-
oughly justiciable. Whether this fully restores the theoretical base of 
the claim depends, perhaps, on whether one agrees that justiciability 
can only be an all or nothing matter, and that moving beyond what 
can be traced to a common or general consensus in applying stan-
dards entails a problem that is significantly different, as respects 
"justiciability," from problems raised by cases that are standardless 
from the beginning.112 · 
2. Empirical Problems 
Empirical problems arise when one looks for evidence that the 
rights thesis does, in fact, accurately describe the Anglo-American 
system of adjudication even in cases that are theoretically justiciable. 
Given the difficulty of the task demanded by the thesis and the 
present scarcity of Herculeses, it is, after all, entirely conceivable that 
a society would deliberately opt, in designing its legal system, for less 
than the ideal. A legal system might, that is, authorize judges 
(through the rule of recognition) to abandon the search for the right 
answer in hard cases despite its theoretical existence, and to exchange 
the role of "judge" in such cases for that of an informed, conscien-
tious legislator. 
In this respect, Dworkin's most recent article is puzzling, for it 
appears designed less to argue that the thesis holds than to provide an 
account, in the hypothetical sense described above, of how judges 
could in theory operate under such a thesis assuming that it holds. 
Consider the illustration from the game of chess that Dworkin em-
111. See Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1060. 
112. Cf. id. at 1080. 
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ploys.113 We are to assume that the rules of chess include a rule 
directing the referee to forfeit a game if one of the players "unreason-
ably" annoys the other in the course of play. The referee must decide 
whether Tal' s smile is sufficiently annoying to justify a forfeit by virtue 
of the rule. Like Hercules, the referee must construct from the 
institution of chess a sufficiently precise theory of the game to yield a 
single correct answer in every case of annoying conduct. But we 
know that this is what the referee must do only because Dworkin 
assumes that he has been instructed to treat the rule in this fashion, 
despite its vagueness. If chess really did include such a rule, a 
referee's proper response could normally be determined only after 
marshalling other evidence beyond the rule and the game of chess 
alone. If, for example, referees decided that they should first issue 
warnings before declaring forfeits (in reality, the most likely possibil-
ity) one would probably conclude that the referee believes he is 
authorized to exercise quasi-legislative power to declare rules prospec-
tively. One would not have a "right" to a forfeit until conduct, now 
specifically described, occurred for a second time. The point is that 
whether a system of standards is to be viewed as a system of entitle-
ments, like the question whether any particular standard is a rule or a 
principle, cannot be determined solely from a priori inspection of the 
standard or set of standards without considering the empirically 
determined attitudes toward such standards of those who must ad-
minister and live under them. 
The evidence on which both Dworkin and Sartorius rest their 
empirical claims consists almost exclusively of what they discover in 
the attitudes of judges and ordinary litigants. They claim that this 
attitude, as reflected in judicial opinions and the arguments litigants 
make, reveals that the relevant judicial community believes it has 
been instructed to treat the legal system as a system of entitlements, 
however vague the standard that is being applied. But surely this is 
rather selective evidence. If one takes into account the views of the 
entire legal profession, as Dworkin seems prepared to do in deciding 
which principles are legal principles,114 one would have to balance the 
cited empirical evidence against the contrary views of numerous 
scholars and judges who have claimed that judges are authorized to 
make fresh choices in hard cases.115 One would also have to account 
113. Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1078-82. 
114. See Model of Rules, supra note 3, at 41. 
115. Sartorius acknowledges that this is the "nearly universal view of academic 
lawyers and legal philosophers . . . [f]ound in journal articles too numerous to men-
tion." R. SARTORIUS, INDIVIDUAL CoNoucr, supra note 1, at 181, 182 n.2; In addi-
tion to H.L.A. Hart, others whom either Sartorius or Dworkin have identified as 
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for the increasing practice of prospective overruling in both common-
law and constitutional cases.116 Finally, even the cited evidence 
would normally have to be weighed against arguments designed to 
explain why judges and litigants might act as if their decisions were 
uniquely required, even though they knew in fact that they were 
not.117 
3. Practical Problems 
The practical objection to the rights thesis, ably presented in a 
recent article by Professor Greenawalt, 118 is a synthesis of both the 
theoretical and empirical problems. If one can transform vague 
standards into standards that embody entitlements simply by adding a 
directive to view them as such, it is not clear what practical difference 
the thesis makes to judges, litigants, or other participants in the 
system. Thus, Dworkin is prepared to accept sentencing decisions by 
judges as cases involving strong (legislative) discretion. Yet nothing 
in Dworkin's account explains why the standards to which a judge 
refers in determining a sentence could not, in theory, yield a single 
correct sentence via the Herculean route; these decisions should also 
become matters of right once the judges are instructed to include 
sentencing decisions within the ambit of the thesis. 119 Administrative 
agencies determining "fair rates" or "unfair trade practices" differ 
from judges determining "unreasonable restraints of trade" or stan-
dards of "due care" only because the latter -are instructed to treat the 
standards as yielding institutionally correct answers, whereas the 
holding views that, in varying degrees, are inconsistent with the rights thesis include 
Gerald MacCallum, Benjamin Cardozo, Felix Cohen, John Dickenson, William O. 
Douglas, Felix Frankfurter, Paul Freund, Gidon Gottleib, Henry M. Hart, Jr., Karl 
Llewellyn, Roscoe Pound, Albert M. Sacks, and A.W.B. Simpson. 'See Sartorius. 
The Justification of the Judicial Decision, 78 ETiilcs 171, 172, 177, 178 (1968); 
R. SARTORIUS, INDMDUAL CONDUCT, supra note 1, at 182 & nn. 2, 3, & 6, 190, 194; 
Judicial Discretion, supra note 3, at 624-25 n.1. It must be admitted that attempts 
to characterize writers as belonging clearly to one side or the other of this dispute 
can be a risky business when one considers variations in context and in the way 
the issue is posed. Thus, it has been argued that none of Dworkin's representative 
antagonists, properly interpreted, can be said to support a view of strong judicial 
discretion-a claim that, if true, only lends weight to the empirical evidence for 
the rights thesis. See Reynolds, Dworkin as Quixote, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 574 (1975), 
116. See Greenawalt, supra note 10, at 385 n.64. 
117. See K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 83, at 24; cf. Voltaire, Epitre a /'Auteur 
du Livre des Trois lmposteurs, Nov. 10, 1770 ("If God did not exist, it would be 
necessary to invent him"). 
118. See Greenawalt, supra note 10. 
119. Cf. id. at 372-74. One might resist this conclusion by suggesting that sen-
tencing decisions are inherently nonjusticiable and thus not among the range of cases 
to which the rights thesis could apply. This response reintroduces the theoretical 
problem of explaining the scope of the thesis in a way that does not beg the question 
and that yields an independent test of justiciability. See text at notes 105-12 supra. 
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former are not. If we give the administrative agency's standard to the 
court, or, conversely, instruct the administrative agency to view the 
' standard as incorporating institutionally correct solutions, then the 
distinction disappears-but only in theory. Even the legislator-the 
paradigmatic case of a decisionmaker with "legal discretion" to pass 
laws whether or not they conform to results thought to be required by 
moral or political theory-may lose his discretion if one incorporates 
in the constitution a directive to pass only legislation "in the public 
interest." Such a directive will presumably transform criticisms di-
rected at the wisdom of the law into criticisms that the law is an 
incorrect measure of the public interest and thus a violation of pre-
existing, system-incorporated rights. 
Whenever the standard is vague, as in these cases, it is difficult to 
see what practical difference will result from these alternative meth-
ods of describing the system. By hypothesis, reasonable men will 
differ about what the standard requires, and more than one solution 
will fall within the range of reasonable difference. In the absence of 
a real Hercules to resolve the dispute, one is hard pressed to explain 
how behavior is affected by the fact that one is instructed to seek a 
system-determined "right" answer instead of being told that more than 
one solution (within the reasonable range) is system-acceptable, even 
though there may be in some theoretical sense an extra-systemic 
"right" answer.120 
B. Accommodating the Thesis to the Positivist' s Model 
Despite the seriousness of the preceding objections, the rights 
thesis can at least be viewed as a plausible theoretical explication of 
the ideal embraced in the concept of adjudication. As such, Dwor-
kin's writings provide a valuable check to the temptation to view 
controversial judicial decisions-simply because they are controver-
sial-as nothing more than rationalizations of a judge's personal 
views. Even though the ideal has not been shown to be practically or 
empirically compatible with all the controversies that judges decide, 
Dworkin and Sartorius help draw attention to the unresolved ques-
tions that should be investigated before the thesis is rejected in any 
particular case as the model that should guide a conscientious judge. 
Let us assume that these questions can be resolved and that the rights 
thesis is correct. How might the positivist respond to the claim that 
the thesis provides a counterexample to his theory? 
120. On the basis of similar considerations, Sartorius now acknowledges that 
"[t]he issue about the existence of uniquely correct decisions is to some extent a 
red herring." R. SARTORIUS, 1NDMDUAL CoNDUCT, supra note 1, at 201-02 (footnote 
omitted), 
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One possibility is simply to extend the argument made earlier in 
this paper in accommodating purpose to the positivist's model in the 
easy case. 121 We suggested there that the same master test that 
identifies the rule also identifies the commonly agreed purpose used 
to interpret the rule. The rights thesis asserts that legal standards be-
yond those implicit in language and purpose contribute to the resolu-
tion of the hard case. But the identification of these additional stan-
dards is not made through a process different in kind from that in-
volved in the easy case. The only difference is that instead of confining 
one's attention to a particular rule and its purposes, the investigation 
now broadens to include the entire institution and all relevant rules 
and practices, together with their underlying purposes. In this manner, 
one extracts a complex set of standards for use in finding the soundest 
solution to the case in question. The ultimate test for whether a 
standard has the necessary "institutional support"122 and hence 
counts as "law'' will be exceedingly complex, but simplicitly was 
never claimed as a feature of the positivist's theoretical model. 
Professor Sartorius, who otherwise agrees with the essence of the 
rights thesis, argues along these lines that the thesis remains consistent 
with positivism: 
Although the actual filling out of such an ultimate criterion would 
be a complex and demanding task for any mature legal system, if 
it is indeed a practical possibility at all, the only claim that need be 
made is that it is in principle possible, and that it is just this possibility 
which in principle underlies the identification of something as an au-
thoritative legal standard. Although perhaps it is a good way from 
Hart's version of positivism, it is in accord with the fundamental 
positivistic tenet as described by Dworkin: "The law of a community 
. . . can be identified and distinguished by specific criteria, by tests 
having to do not with ... content but with ... pedigree .... "123 
Dworkin's response to this attempt to rescue positivism is found in 
the second article in his trilogy.124 "Institutional support" cannot 
serve as an ultimate test for law in the positivist's sense, because the 
rights thesis does not require a judge, in attempting to construct the 
soundest theory of law, to accept as dispositive the fact that other 
judges accept any particular theory as the soundest. Each judge's 
task is to find the unique soundest theory, the content of which, 
121. See text at notes 45-47 supra. 
122. The term was employed by Dworkin in his original article and became the 
focus for his subsequent debate with Sartorius over the compatibility of positivism 
and the rights thesis. See Model of Rules, supra note 3, at 41; Sartorius, supra 
note 13, at 156; Social Rules, supra note 3, at 874-78; R. SARTORIUS, INDIVIDUAL 
CoNDucr, supra note 1, at 204-10. 
123. Sartorius, supra note 13, at 156. 
124. See Social Rules, supra note 3, at 876-78. 
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however, is largely independent of what other judges think it to be. 
The distinction is between what Dworkin calls a "normative rule," 
which ascribes duties to individuals whether or not they accept or 
acknowledge them, and a "social rule," which only describes duties 
that are, in fact, accepted.125 The positivist's test is a social rule. The 
rights thesis, in contrast, imports a test that makes relevant to the 
determination of legal validity normative arguments about what 
"ought" to be recognized -as accepted practice, whether or not it is so 
recognized. 
There are two paths one might take in evaluating this response, 
each corresponding to a different interpretation of what it means to 
say that "normative arguments" must occur in applying a test of 
"institutional support." The first interpretation views "normative ar-
guments" as referring only to what is entailed by the need to provide 
a "consistent rationale" for accepted practices, with the latter still 
serving, in the positivist's sense, as the basic mark of a community's 
legal standards. This is the path Sartorius takes.126 People can, 
after all, disagree about what consistency requires with respect to 
unanticipated or controversial issues, and in that sense disagree about 
what "ought" to be done, while still agreeing that maximum consist-
ency with existing practices determines the correct answer. Norma-
tive arguments in this•sense, although they may take into account the 
reasons for or the underlying purposes of existing practices, make 
no attempt to justify those underlying purposes or baseline practices. 
But Dworkin also uses "normative argument" in a sense that explicitly 
denies the conclusive relevance of any baseline reference to concordant 
practices. It is in this sense that a vegetarian might argue that it 
is a present duty of society to refrain from killing animals for food, 
even though existing practice does not conform to such a rule.127 
Let us assume that normative arguments in this second sense are 
properly made whenever judges decide "hard cases." One might still 
be able to view the resulting legal system as compatible with positiv-
ism by distinguishing between two levels at which such normative 
arguments about the law may be advanced: At the basic level, deter-
mined by the rule of recognition, one may find a social rule setting 
forth instructions phrased in normative terms for the identification of 
legal standards; at a secondary level, one may discover normative 
arguments about whether those instructions have been followed. If 
normative arguments are limited to the secondary level, the master 
125. See id. at 860. 
126. See R. SARTORIUS, INDIVIDUAL CONDUCT, supra note 1, at 209. 
127. See Social Rules, supra note 3, at 861-62. 
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rule model remains theoretically intact and basically a social rule test 
for law, even though all of the crucial arguments about the legally 
required result in particular cases occur at this secondary, normative 
level. 
The point can be illustrated by reference to an assumed Kingdom 
of Rex, with the social rule of recognition that "whatever Rex enacts 
is law" and a single enactment by Rex: "All disputes are to be 
settled as justice requires." In this simplified equity system, norma-
tive disputes (in the second sense) will arise over what is required by 
the system's explicit incorporation of moral standards. But what 
makes these disputes at all relevant as a means of determining the law 
is the fact that the appropriate officials accept, in Hart's sense, the 
basic rule of recognition. Hart is the first to concede that in this 
respect law and morality may well overlap, as evidenced in the United 
States, for example, by a variety of constitutional concepts that "explic-
itly incorporate principles of justice or substantive moral values."128 
Far from providing a counterexample to the positivist's conceptual 
model, such systems reenforce the theoretical validity of that model 
by making the legal relevance of the normative debate dependent on 
the instructions contained in the master test.129 
128. CoNcEPT OF LA.w, supra note 2, at 199. 
129. The simplified equity system described in the text may strike many as too 
indeterminate to yield the kind of guidance normally associated with the existence 
of a "legal system." See J. RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 137-39 (1975); 
L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 34, 39 (1963). The force of this objection 
should diminish as courts begin to accumulate a body of case law and to recognize 
that "doing justice" includes taking account of settled expectations under such cases, 
even if it is thought that some of them had initially been decided erroneously. See 
Sartorius, supra note 13, at 152. Compare R. SARTORIUS, INDMDUAL CONDUCT, supra 
note 1, at 176-79, with R. WASSERSTROM, supra note 43, at 150-52. Indeed, it has 
never been clear that the common law, which includes judicial power to overrule 
past decisions, operates differently in any essential respect from a system that might 
have emerged from Rex's equity system. See Simpson, The Common Law and Legal 
Theory in OXFORD EssAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 77, 79, 85-88 (2d ser., A.W.B. Simp-
son ed. 1973 ). But see J. RAz, supra, at 140. 
In any event, objections to counting such systems as "legal" do not affect the 
point made in the text: One who insists that such systems are "legal" wiII find 
that Hart's model can accommodate the system. Hart's version of positivism, in 
short, need not be seen as conceptually linking "law" with a requirement that legal 
standards be ascertainable with any specified degree of certainty. (Raz, in contrast, 
does insist on just such a conceptual link. See id. at 146 (systems of "absolute 
discretion are not legal systems")). Hart, it is true, claims that in cases of sufficient 
uncertainty the judge's decision is not determined by legal norms, but that claim 
can be explained as based not on what is logically entailed by Hart's definition 
of law or his account of social rules, but on empirical assumptions concerning what 
most legal systems could realistically expect, and have in fact demanded, of judges 
in hard cases. If Dworkin's Herculean instructions can intelligibly be given to judges 
and can be defended as yielding (in theocy) externally determined solutions, as the 
rights thesis assumes, Hart's account of law can adjust to the different empirical 
assumption without altering the basic theoretical model. See text at notes 132-35 
infra. 
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Dworkin's description of the Anglo-American legal system differs 
from Rex's equity system only because the instruction given to judges 
is of the more complex form, described by the rights thesis. Norma-
tive debates about the "soundest theory of law" occur and are legally 
relevant (assuming the empirical claims are established) only because 
the underlying social rule directs judges to engage in this method of 
resolving hard cases. That this is the case is revealed by the fact that 
at critical points throughout Dworkin's argument-in deciding 
whether standards are rules or principles and whether the legal sys-
tem is a system of entitlements-resolution of the issue, as we have 
seen, turns on an inspection of the actual attitudes and practices of the 
relevant community. Indeed, the only empirical evidence for the rights 
thesis itself is based on claims about what is accepted in fact by judges 
and litigants as the proper way to decide cases. This inevitable re-
course to empirically measured attitudes to resolve critical issues in 
Dworkin's account supports, rather than contradicts, the thesis that the 
ultimate test for law is a basic rule of recognition, determined by 
reference to the accepted practice of the officials of the system. 
Viewed in this light, the dispute between Hart and Dworkin 
concerning judicial discretion in hard cases emerges as a dispute over 
the empirical question discussed in a preceding section: It is a 
disagreement over what are in fact the accepted "closure instruc-
tions"130 for the system. Hart suggests that judges have accepted 
closure instructions directing them to decide the hard case through 
the exercise of quasi-legislative discretion.131 Dworkin claims that the 
closure instructions in such cases require judges to perform the Hercu-
lean task described in Hard Cases. In either case, it remains true that 
how and whether a particular system is closed is an empirical ques-
tion, to be determined by inspection of the directions that the judge 
finds in the positivist's master test-the accepted social rule of recog-
nition.132 
A determined nonpositivist might respond to this final attempt at 
reconciliation between positivism and the rights thesis in three ways. 
First, he may question 'whether it remains meaningful to talk of a 
"test" of "pedigree" in systems such as Rex's where the positivist's 
theoretical model is preserved, but only at the cost of rendering it of 
little practical use in resolving critical arguments about what "the 
law" requires. This objection highlights the ambiguity of the term 
130. See text at notes 37-38 supra. 
131. See C.C. art. 1 (Swiss Civil Code 1972) (judge is to decide cases in which 
a rule is unclear as if he were a legislator); J. STONE, supra note 38, at 29 n.21, 189 
&n.124. 
132. See J. STONE, supra note 38, at 188-89. 
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"positivism" itself. It may be that we have moved some distance 
from the view that a ~•master test," capable of actually identifying 
with some precision all standards relevant to legal decision, forms the 
core of a positivist's theory. It may also be that those who believe 
there is a conceptual link between "legal standards" and some mini-
mum degree of authoritative definiteness and clarity in such stan-
dards133 will refuse to categorize the standards used to decide cases in 
Rex's system as "legal." But if the "core" of a positivist's theory is, 
instead, "the simple contention that it is in no sense a necessary truth 
that laws reproduce or satisfy certain demands of morality,"134 then 
Rex's equity system and the rights thesis are both consistent with a 
positivist's perspective. Moral standards become relevant to legal 
decisions in both cases only because they are contingently, not neces-
sarily, made relevant by social rules. Content is crucial in deciding 
which standards to use, but only because pedigree makes it so. The 
fact that one cannot provide a proof procedure either for checking the 
accuracy of decisions employing such legally adopted moral standards 
or for demonstrating which such standards are the correct ones, does 
not affect the core claim that legal and moral standards are concep-
tually distinct.135 
A second response to the claim that the rights thesis represents a 
disagreement over closure instructions might try to capitalize on the 
very fact that such a claim concedes the existence of disagreement con-
cerning this particular aspect of the rule of recognition. Even 
though the empirical evidence for the rights thesis may be incon-
clusive, it is, we have suggested, at least strong enough to indicate 
that a genuine and unresolved dispute exists over the question of 
how to decide hard cases. Thus, Dworkin has indeed provided 
a counterexample to the thesis that in every legal system there 
exists a social rule that settles the limits of a judge's duty qua judge. 
But this thesis is largely one of Dworkin's own making, rather than an 
essential aspect of positivism or a claim that Hart makes, "at least in 
his more careful moments."136 Hart has never denied that the rule of 
recognition may itself be uncertain in some respects, and that authori-
tative resolution of some questions may thus depend on a court's 
success in getting a particular decision accepted by the rest of the 
133. See note 129- supra; Dickinson, The Problem of the Unprovided Case, 81 
U. PA. L. REV. 115, 126 (1932). 
134. CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 2, at 181. 
135. Cf. R. SARTORWS, INDIVIDUAL CONDUCT, supra note 1, at 208-09. See also 
note 129 supra. 
136. R. SARTORWS, INDIVIDUAL CONDUCT, supra note 1, at 210. 
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relevant community. "Here all that succeeds is success."137 One 
may agree with Dworkin that until such success is achieved, the 
positivist must admit that there simply is no social rule on the issue.138 
But that admission leaves the theoretical model intact, raising at most 
a question of the relationship between, on the one hand, the efficacy 
of a legal system, and, on the other, the degree of uncertainty that can 
be tolerated in the rule of recognition. When an unresolved question 
is fundamental, the existence of the legal system may be seriously 
threatened.139 But when, as here, the question concerns how judges 
should decide hard cases, the riots occur in the academic journals, not 
in the streets, and are thus "system tolerable" in the extreme.140 
A third possible response at once illustrates both the incomplete-
ness of Dworkin's argument and the potential threat that the rights 
thesis could pose for the positivist if the argument could be completed. 
The analogy to Rex's equity system, it might be suggested, misses 
the point or assumes what is in issue. The analogy assumes that 
the normative dispute turns into a sociological question of fact 
once one reaches the claim that "whatever Rex enacts is law." But it 
is this basic claim itself that the rights thesis subjects to legally 
relevant, normative debate. A judge in Rex's system does not acquit 
himself of his responsibility to apply "the law" by showing only that a 
particular decision is "just," and that Rex has decreed that cases be 
decided as justice requires. The judge must also be prepared to 
entertain, as legally relevant, arguments concerning the ultimate justifi-
cation, if any, (not merely the stated or implicit reasons for accept-
137. CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 2, at 149. 
138. See Social Rules, supra note 3, at 871-72. 
139. See CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 2, at 149. 
140. Thus, it is hard to agree with Dworkin that uncertainty in this respect is 
somehow more fatal to positivism than uncertainty concerning a rare issue such as 
Parliament's power to bind future parliaments. !See Social Rules, supra note 3, at 
872. It is true that "hard cases" arise more frequently than cases involving Parlia-
ment's power to pass entrenching clauses; in that sense the disagreement over closure 
instructions is an issue judges must continually face. 'But unlike the case of judges 
in disagreement about what to do if Parliament did pass an entrenching clause, dis-
putes about how one is to decide "hard cases" will largely escape detection in the 
actual outcome of cases given the practical difficulty of distinguishing between the 
exercise of weak discretion on the one hand and strong, but wise, discretion on the 
other. See text at notes 118-20 supra. 
For similar reasons, the fact that judicial decisions are written as if there is a 
"right answer" does not prove the judges have accepted the rights thesis. Because 
of the practical problems of distinguishing strong from weak discretion, decisions 
are not likely to distinguish explicitly between the claim that a decision is "correct" 
as measured by pre-existing legal standards (a judicial opinion) and the claim that 
the decision is "correct" as measured by political or moral philosophy (a legislative 
opinion). Of course, in applying closure instructions applicable only to "hard cases," 
judges can make mistakes in deciding when they are dealing with such a case. See 
text at notes 49 & 98 supra. 
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ance) of the rule that "whatever Rex enacts is law." It is in this 
sense that the "process of justification must carry the lawyer very deep 
into political and moral theory, and well past the point where it would 
be accurate to say that any 'test' of 'pedigree' exists for deciding which 
of two different justifications of our political institutions is su-
perior."141 
Under this interpretation, the issue between Dworkin and the 
positivist is sharply joined in a way that admittedly does not permit 
reconciliation. But the interpretation raises two new problems. First, 
it now seems clear that one could no longer draw any distinction 
between legal standards, on the one hand, and extra-legal-moral or 
political-standards on the other;142 as a result, the rights thesis 
collapses into the most traditional kind of classical natural law theory. 
Second, one is now left without any argument to support the newly 
interpeted thesis; for the thesis now appears to have left the confines 
of descriptive theory for the larger realm of conceptual inquiry into 
the meaning and nature of "law." Dworkin's analysis of "social" and 
"normative" rules may be both conceptual and accurate. One may 
concede, that is, that the language of obligation can be used either to 
describe acknowledged duties or to assert that duties exist, whether or 
not they are acknowledged. But what is missing from this account is 
an argument that demonstrates that "law" necessarily rests on an 
underlying normative rather than social rule. As an empirical mat-
ter, it is difficult to deny that social structures can be organized in 
ways that fit the positivist's model-that is, in such a way as to make 
the fact of acceptance the final court of appeal in determining the 
appropriateness of applying organized sanctions to specified conduct. 
Insistence upon the necessary legal relevance of normative appeals 
beyond what is, in fact, accepted requires one to explain what it is 
about the nature of "law" that makes this newly interpreted thesis a 
more accurate account of the concept of a legal system. In the 
conclusion to this paper, I shall briefly describe the kind of investiga-
tion that might be expected to provide such an explanation. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
It may be helpful to place the preceding discussion into somewhat 
141. See Social Rules, supra note 3, at 877. 
142. Raz and Sartorius both conclude that Dworkin is driven to this position 
when he attempts to maintain his thesis as a counterexample to positivism. See 
Raz, supra note 10, at 844; R. SARTORIUS, INDMDUAL CoNDUCT, supra note 1 at 
208. Dworkin, on the other hand, appears steadfastly to resist the suggestion that 
his thesis entails the inability to distinguish legal from nonlegal standards. Compare 
id. at 206, with Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1105-06. 
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broader perspective by comparing Dworkin's attack on positivism 
with other nonpositivist theories. 
Legal positivism's traditional target was the classical natural law 
theorist's claim that norms otherwise identifiable as "law" would not, 
in fact, qualify as law if they were sufficiently unjust. Dworkin's 
attack belongs to a more modem version of nonpositivism. The new 
nonpositivist does not deny that if one can determine a norm is law, 
further reference to content is unnecessary for determining the norm's 
legal status. Instead, the attack is directed at the antecedent of that 
hypothetical. In some cases, one cannot determine whether the norm 
is law at all without first inspecting content; in these cases, at least, 
the separation of fact and value becomes blurred and the conclusion 
that the norm is law may entail the conclusion that the norm is not 
unjust (at least not egregiously so). 
The common feature of both the classical and modem approach 
(in addition to their rejection of the more extreme versions of legal 
realism) is a refusal to accept the positivist's insistence on the strict 
separation of the "is" and the "ought"; in this respect both might be 
thought to represent varieties of a natural law theory. But the 
obvious difference between the two approaches is important and 
should not be glossed over by the choice of a label designed to 
emphasize the common feature. Faced with an unambiguously evil 
statute, enacted by a supremely competent legislature, the new "natu-
ral law" theorist, unlike his classical predecessor, cannot deny the 
norm its legal status any more than does the positivist.143 (Both may, 
of course, urge that its moral worth be considered in deciding whether 
it should be obeyed.) It is only when we move from the "unambig-
uous" to the "hard case" that the new theorist discerns an essential 
blurring of fact and value. 
This difference in approach is sufficiently sharp that the classical 
theorist is not likely to view the modem nonpositivist as much of an 
ally. The impetus for the classical approach rested in part on the 
desire to construct a unified theory of obligation: With the bottom 
line for any actor-what one ought to do--as his ultimate goal, the 
classical theorist needed only to restrict legal norms to those that also 
passed moral muster in order to preserve a sense of unqualified 
fidelity to law while maintaining the primacy of moral reasons among 
the reasons for acting. In contrast, the new approach appears at 
times to be making a somewhat quibbling point about the inherent 
143. The accuracy of this description of Dworkin's position in comparison to 
classical natural law theory depends on how one resolves the confusion concerning 
whether Dworkin thinks legal and nonlegal standards can ever be separated. See 
note 142 supra. 
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limits of language and human foresight. When language and pur-
pose fail to guide unequivocally, one must fall back on something 
else, and that something else might just as well be (or "must be," 
depending on the particular variation of the theory) the judge's sense 
of what best "coheres" with the aim of the entire legal system. The 
new approach, in short, capitalizes on the problem of uncertainty to 
reintroduce value judgments into descriptions of the law, but in so 
doing gives away most of what the classical debate was about in the 
first place. 
From another perspective, however, the modern approach repre-
sents a much more serious challenge to positivism precisely because it 
never was clear just what the classical debate was all about. The 
claim that "immoral law is not law" apparently assumes that there is a 
subject to which the predicate "immoral" can attach and thus seems 
to concede that there are formal tests for legal validity; the question 
whether one should also require substantive tests appears mainly as a 
problem of choice on pragmatic or theoretical grounds. The positiv-
ist's choice for the wider concept, for reasons of both conceptual 
clarity and practical merit in moral deliberation, 144 has never been 
easy to challenge. But when the claim that there are formal tests for 
validity itself is challenged, the positivist will never reach the question 
of choice until he re-examines his model of law to determine whether 
the alleged defects do in fact exist and, if so, whether the model can 
be repaired. 
I have argued that the positivist's model remains intact in the face 
of Dworkin's argument, primarily because the rights thesis is cloaked 
in empirical claims and girded by arguments peculiar to a particular 
legal system. The conceptual theorist can discount the thesis-even 
if true-as an accidental, not an essential, aspect of law, explaining 
that the normative debates that the thesis entails occur only because 
social rules make such debates relevant to determining legal validity. 
The theory fails, in short, precisely because, and to the extent that, it 
is presented and viewed as a descriptive theory. If the arguments 
Dworkin makes for the need to refer beyond purpose and rule to the 
underlying justification of the entire institution could be connected to 
the concept of law itself, the blow to positivism would be more serious. 
One possible direction that a further inquiry along these lines 
might take is the following. The fundamental premise of the inquiry 
would be that an adequate legal theory must preserve the distinction 
between legal and coercive systems-the basis, after all, for Hart's 
144. See CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 2, at 205-07. 
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criticism of Austin.145 From that basic premise, the inquiry would 
explore the extent to which a model of law that roots legal validity in 
the fact of acceptance of a basic social rule by a group of officials 
accurately preserves this distinction between "obligation" and "being 
obliged." If_one can show that the concept of obligation is accurately 
reflected only in a model of law that makes legal validity dependent, 
not on the fact of acceptance alone, but also on a good-faith claim 
that the system and standards thus described are "acceptable" to those 
governed by the system, to that extent the positivist's model will 
require modification. It is in this respect-in Dworkin's insights 
concerning the persistence with which claims of legal validity are 
linked with claims of normative validity-that one finds in the rights 
thesis valuable hints for the development of an improved, conceptual 
theory of law. 
145. See note 6 supra. 
